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Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded its
Congressional Mandate to Facilitate a
“National Market System” in Securities
Trading?
Dale A. Oesterle

Abstract

The SEC is currently holding hearings on sweeping changes to the micro-structure
of the country’s securities trading markets - modifying the trade through rule, for
example. Professor Oesterle argues that the SEC should not be in the business of
so structuring the country’s securities markets in the first place. In the piece he
chronicles the SEC’s expansive interpretation of its power under Congress’s 1975
National Market System Amendments to the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act
and questions whether Congress intended to grant the SEC such a mandate.

Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded its Congressional Mandate to Facilitate a
“National Market System” in Securities Trading?
Dale A. Oesterle1

In 1975 Congress, after active and far reaching hearings on the nation’s securities
markets, adopted significant amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(1975 amendments). The amendments marked a major turning point in the regulation of
the securities industry. Congress “directed” the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the SEC) to “facilitate the establishment” a “national market system” for the trading of
securities.2 The mandate still dominates the SEC’s regulatory philosophy. The SEC has
ceremonially referenced the mandate, abbreviated to the now well-known acronym
“NMS,” ever since in most all its rule proposals or concept releases on market structure.3
What is curiously absent, however, in SEC releases and in the literature in general
on market structure is any close analysis on the contours of the Congressional mandate.
The issue is particularly poignant at present given the SEC’s current proposed Regulation
NMS, which, if implemented, would effect a major overhaul of the structure of our public
trading markets.4
The 1975 Congressional amendments vested substantial discretion in the SEC to
flesh out and implement Congress’s admittedly hazy, inchoate vision of what a national
market system ought to be. Congress did indicate unequivocally that it was directing the
SEC to make progress on two fronts. First, Congress directed the SEC to encourage
better communication among the various markets. And second, Congress directed the
SEC to eliminate inappropriate burdens on competition among securities trading market
centers.
The SEC was, after its successful attack in 1975 on fixed brokerage
commissions,5 very deliberate in pursing the second objective. It waited, for example,
1
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Section 11A(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78K-1.
3
The newest SEC rule-making initiative, a stunner, uses an abbreviation of the Congressional language in
its title, proposed Regulation NMS. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-50870 (Dec. 16, 2004),
69 Fed. Reg. 77424 (Dec. 27,2004), www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-50870.htm (hereinafter SEC Rel. No.
34-50870, page numbers refer to the online document). The first version of the proposal had an extended
discussion of the national market system. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-49325 (Feb, 2004),
69 Fed. Reg. 11126 (Mar.9, 2004), www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-49325.htm at page 9-15 (hereinafter
SEC Rel. No. 34-49325; page references in the article will be to the sec.gov online htm documents). The
other major milestones in the SEC’s development of the NMS are the creation of the consolidated system
from disseminating market information in the 70s, the incorporation of the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.
securities into the NMS in the 80s, and the adoption of the Order Handing Rules in the 90s. Id. at 5
4
See SEC Rel. No. 34-50870, reproposing SEC Rel. No. 34-49325 (Feb. 26, 2004).
5
For a discussion of fixed commission rates see, e.g., William F. Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates:
A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 675 (1970); G. William Schwert, Pubic Regulation of the
National Securities Exchanges: A Test of the Capture Hypothesis, 8 Bell. J. Econ. 128 (1977). On May 1,
2
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until 2000 to eliminate the last vestiges of the New York Stock Exchange’s off-board
trading restrictions.6 Critics have, over the years, disparaged the SEC’s caution.7
The SEC has, however, been much more aggressive in acting on the first charge,
moving quickly to establish market linkage systems and steadily nurturing and growing
those linkages over time. Indeed, the SEC has been so active that it, in my view, has
exceeded even the wide mandate of the 1975 legislation. Critics have been largely silent
here.8 Many have taken issue with the wisdom of specific SEC decisions9 but few have
questioned whether the SEC has the authority to do what it has done and is attempting to
do. This essay develops the position.
The discussion will begin with the history and language of the 1975 amendments,
followed by a summary of the highlights of the SECs application of its power under the
amendments. A short section on a speculative alternative history concludes the analysis.
Before proceeding with the argument, however, a short note on the important
subtleties on the issue of federal agency authorization. The essay takes two distinct
positions on authorization depending on the SEC regulation. First, the essay argues that
the SEC was operating outside its statutory authority when it approved the inter-market
order routing and execution system. The proposed Regulation NMS “trade-through
rules,” discussed below, fall in this category. Second, the essay argues that the SEC may
have been operating inside its literal grant of authority when it approved inter-market
1975, NYSE commission rates became freely negotiable and immediately dropped by about 25%. Gregg
A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J.L.& Econ. 273, 280
(1983).
6
See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Rescinded NYSE Rule 390, Exchange Act Release No.
34-42728 (May 5, 2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 30175. Prior to 1975, our national stock exchanges had rules in
place that prohibited their members from trading anywhere but on the exchange. For a discussion of the
SEC’s slow nibbling away at the prohibition that culminated with the 2000 release see Mark Borrelli,
Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 815, 838 – 840 (2001). Similarly, the NYSE
retained a stringent version of Rule 500 governing the delisting of stocks, requiring a 66.6% vote of the
outstanding shares and less than a 10% negative vote, until 1997. Press Releases, NYSE (November 6,
1997 and October 1, 1998); www.nyse.com/press/press.html. There are numerous other examples. It took
the SEC 15 years to put in place a system of unlisted trading privileges in Nasdaq securities on the national
exchanges. Joint Industry Plan: Order Approving Proposed Reporting Plan for Nasdaq/NMS Securities
Traded on an Exchange on an Unlisted or Listed Basis, Exch. Act Rel. 34-28146 (June 26, 1990).
There is some academic commentary that Congress and the SEC have miscalculated the costs and
benefits of these types of exchange rules. E.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L.
Rev. 1453 (1997)(restrictive rules may be consistent with shareholder welfare). I have disagreed. E.g.,
Dale Oesterle, Comments on the SEC’s Market 2000 Report, 19 J. Corp. Law 483 (1994)(discussing, in
addition to NYSE Rules 360 and 500, the resistance to decimalization). In any event, this issue is reserved
in this essay.
7
E.g., Borrelli, supra note 6; Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure
of the National Market System, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 315 [noting exchange rules against delisting and
restrictions on off-board trading].
8
There are two important exceptions. See Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical
Look at the SEC’s National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 883 (1981); Walter Werner, Adventure in
Social Control of Finance: The National Market System for Securities, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1233 (1975).
9
E.g., Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation Ahead of
Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 753 (1999).
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trade reporting and quote display systems, but that it has deviated from Congress’s
expressed hopes and goals when doing so, both in relying on single rather than
competitive inter-market systems and in micro-managing the details of trading market
structure in running those systems. The Regulation NMS quotation “access rules” and
“market data” rules, discussed below, are in this category.
On the first argument, I do not and cannot claim that the federal courts, given
their track record of deference to agency authority,10 will agree. It is highly unlikely that
any court will follow, or even listen to, this analysis. Nor will Congress act to bring the
SEC into compliance with the ‘75 mandate, with new hearings and legislation; there is no
current political interest in the issue. My claim is that of a resigned academic; in my
view the agency has strayed outside its authority and we have come too far to do much
about it -- it is the proverbial water over the dam.
One could argue that my second claim is technically not an argument over legal
authority at all but rather more like simple displeasure by a principal over the direction of
decisions made by an authorized agent. The agent, although authorized in its action, has
not been sympathetic to, or consistent with the principal’s anticipated outcomes or its
fundamental hopes and wishes. Congress thought the SEC would take a different tack
than the one it took.
One could also take a third, more moderate, position, and simply note that, given
the history noted below, the SEC, although technically authorized to do what is has done,
also has the authority to reverse its course. The SEC is not itself bound by its own past
policy mistakes given its mandate. That is, the 1975 amendments do notrequire the
course of action that the SEC has chosen to undertake. The amendments are open-ended
enough to justify a SEC strategy that is much less market intrusive than the path the SEC
has chosen. The SEC is not bound to the past by a doctrine of precedent (stare decisis) as
are the courts. It would take a very strong, dedicated SEC Chairman to reverse course,
however, bucking those with vested interests in the current market structure. Again, this
does not appear to be in the cards.
Realistically, I am left only with the same remark made by a British play-by-play
golf commentator on the completion of a putt by a competitor for an eleven on a short
hole in a major tournament. The commentator had been silent since the competitor’s fifth
or sixth shot on the par three. On the sinking of the putt he said simply and quietly:
“Pity.”
The History of the 1975 Amendments

10

See, e.g., Domestic Sec. v SEC, 333 F.3d. 239,248-249 (D.C. Cir. 2003)(deference to SEC’s approval of
the Nasdaq Nasdaq Market Center (successor to the SuperMontage) Trading System); NASD v SEC, 801
F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(deference to SEC decision on NASD fess for ECN access to quotes on NMS
securities). See also United States v Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557-58 (2nd Cir. 1991)(deference to SEC
“legislative regulations” unless “arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute,” citing Chevron
v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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In 1968 and 1969 brokerage houses on Wall Street went through what is now
known as the “Back Room Crisis.” Trading volume in shares increased exponentially at
a time when the mechanism for settling or clearing trades still required the physical
transfer of certificates from one place to another and the creation and transfer of a flood
of related papers (among other things, a floor report, a comparison, transfer instructions,
contract sheets, and a settlement statement).11 In the late ‘60s, the cumbersome physical
process broke down and trades began to fail in extraordinary numbers.12 The loss of
control over securities also invited massive theft.13 More than two hundred brokerage
houses, some storied old houses, failed.14
Congress, looking for a culprit, asked the SEC to study the market activity of
institutional investors.15 The SEC produced its multi-volume 1971 Institutional Investor
Study that largely let the institutional investors off the hook.16 In the SEC’s transmittal
letter to Congress, however, the SEC dropped a bombshell. The SEC came out in favor
of “the creation of a strong central market system for securities of national importance, in
which all buying and selling interest in these securities could participate and be
represented under a competitive regime.”17 The SEC sought the creation of an
overarching communications system that would include all the existing exchanges and
their specialists, over-the-counter market makers, and anybody else for that matter, and in
which dealers would compete with each other for order flow.
The participation of competing dealers in the central market will …reduce
the element of monopoly power which has accompanied past efforts to establish a
central market and will make it possible for potential abuses of such monopoly
power to be controlled not only by regulation but to an increasing degree by
competition. An essential characteristic of such a system would be the prompt
reporting of all securities trades to the public on a comparative basis…[O]ur
objective is to see a strong central market system created to which all investors
have access, in which all qualified broker-dealers and existing market institutions
may participate in accordance with their respective capabilities, and which is
controlled not only by appropriate regulation but also by the forces of
competition.18
11

For a discussion see Marshall E. Blume, Jeremy J. Siegel & Dan Rottenberg, Revolution on Wall Street:
the Rise and Decline of the New York Stock Exchange, Ch. 7 (1993). Professor Werner attacks the
Consolidated Tape Plan. Werner, note 8 supra at 1280-82. He would be stunned at how far regulation has
come since.
12
Up to 40% of the trades failed. Blume , supra note 11 at 117.
13
From 1966 to 1970, the New York City Police estimated that $100 million worth of securities were
stolen or just disappeared. The SEC and FBI valued the missing securities at more than $400 million.
Blume, supra note 11 at 121.
14
Id. at 120.
15
Pub. L. No. 90-438 (July 29, 1968).
16
Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange SEC, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971)(institutions had only gradually increased their share of outstanding equity securities over time
and their holdings were concentrated in the larger companies). The study did ask for increased institutional
reporting of securities holdings by institutional investors, however.
17
Id. at xxii.
18
Id. at xxv.
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Over the next few years the SEC conducted hearings aimed at defining what later
came to be known as the “national market system” concept. The NYSE attempted first to
stonewall the initiative19 and, when that failed, produced its own recommendation, known
as the Martin Report, that all trading should be consolidated on one national exchange.20
The SEC continued its campaign, issuing a Statement on the Future Structure of the
Securities Markets in February of 1972. In the Statement the SEC defined its goal as:
A system of communications by which the various elements of the marketplace,
be they exchanges or over-the-counter markets, are tied together. It also includes
a set of rules governing the relationships which will prevail among market
participants.21
The centerpiece of the SEC proposal was a call for a nationwide system for disclosure of
market information designed to make trading price and volume information in all markets
universally available. The policy, as announced, was sorely in need of some meat on its
bones so in the Statement the SEC established three advisory committees to report on the
best means of implementing the SEC’s goal.
After the advisory committees reported, the SEC issued in 1973 a detailed plan
for the achievement of its central market system goal.22 The Policy Statement described
how a consolidated transaction reporting system would operate and what rules would be
necessary to ensure that information disseminated through that system would not be
misleading. The Policy Statement also described a national system for disclosing price
quotations (bids and offers) on exchange traded securities, a new wrinkle in the proposal
that had originally focused only on reporting the prices of actual trades (last sales). Both
systems have now been put in place, as detailed below, but two additional proposals in
the 1973 report have not.
The Policy Statement also recommended an “auction trading rule” that would
provide price priority protections for all public orders entered into a proposed central
electronic repository and a “public preference rule” in which public orders entered in the
repository would have preferential treatment over orders by professionals acting as
principals unless the professionals bettered the public bids or offers. This was dramatic
stuff – the SEC was considering rules that controlled order routing and execution for all
the country’s markets.
It was the beginning of the SEC’s many musings on a perfect national order
execution system for securities. The SEC has pursued the national system with a two19

Blume, supra note 11, at 164.
Martin, Jr., The Securities Markets, a Report with Recommendations (1971). The report recommended
an integration of the NYSE, the AMEX, and the regional exchanges and could be “composed of two
divisions.” The report added that the NYSE and the AMEX ought to be the divisions.
21
Statement of the Securities and Exchange SEC on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets (1972),
37 Fed Reg. 5286.
22
Policy Statement of the Securities and Exchange SEC on the Structure of a Central Market System
(1973).
20
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part strategy. Part one has consisted of a periodic series of grand scale concept releases
on various national execution system proposals that are floated and not adopted.23 Part
two has been a succession of detailed rule making initiatives that build a national system
piece-by-piece, from the bottom up. The part two initiates have been adopted. Implicit
threats came in the part one, grand proposals: “Work with us on the details or you may
get a system you really do not want.” And payoffs came in SRO participation in and
assent to the SEC’s technical rules in the part two proposals.24 The SEC history of rule
making initiatives on market structure is worthy of careful study.
The SEC transmittal letter with the Institutional Investor Study of 1971 and the
1972 Statement set the conceptual stage. But the detail work began in late 1972. When a
joint task force of the national and regional exchanges and the National Association of
Securities Dealers25 (which operated the then “over-the-counter” (OTC) market26)
dissolved in jurisdictional squabbles, the SEC took the bit and, in late 1972, promulgated
Rule 17a-5, ordering all exchanges and the NASD to submit proposals for a transactionreporting plan.27 The SEC’s authority to do so was questionable; the SEC grounded the
initiative in the market participant record keeping and reporting requirements of Section
17(a) of the 34 Act, a real stretch. The only proposal submitted created a “Consolidated
Tape Association plan” (CTA plan) run by the Securities Industry Automation
Corporation (SIAC), a subsidiary of the NYSE and the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX).28 The Consolidated Tape, reporting trades, opened on a limited basis in June
of 1975 and was fully operational by 1976.

23

See the SEC Reports in 1972, 1973, 1978, 1991, 1994, 2000 cited in notes 21,22,93, & 128. For a
discussion of the 1991 and 1994 Reports see Dale A. Oesterle, Comments on the SEC’s Market 2000
Report, 19 J. Corp. L. 483 (1994).
24
This creates the SEC’s convenient position, often heard at conferences, that the SEC is only “facilitating”
not “mandating” or “creating” a national market system; that is, the SEC is working with the trading
community in an innocent, public spirited mediator style role to structure the national market. A related
position is that the SEC changes are “incremental” and “modest” compared to what the SEC “could do.” I
am confident that SEC staff, present and past, believe these positions. Given pace of incremental changes,
like a boulder rolling downhill, I would suggest that the number and nature of the incremental changes is
now an avalanche and that, viewed as a whole, the SEC role is now controlling. See the Conclusion,
below.
25
The NASD is a national securities association registered with the SEC under Section 15A of the
Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 ( ). The organization provides, among other things, selfregulation of the OTC market.
26
In 1971, NASD formed the Nasdaq system, a computerized securities information center. The system
rationalized the OTC market by providing up to date quotation information from market makers on liquid
(heavily traded) OTC securities. By 1984 the Nasdaq system began to provide automatic execution of some
trades. See generally, NASD v SEC, 801 F.2d 1415, 1416-1418 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(history of Nasdaq).
27
The history of the Consolidated Tape is in Collection and Dissemination of Transition Reports and Last
Sale Data, Exch. Act Rel. No. 16,589 (Feb. 19, 1980).
28
Notice of Receipt of Plan, Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-10026 (March 6, 1973), 36 Fed. Reg. 6443; Notice of
SEC Action Declaring Effective a Consolidated Tape Plan Filed Pursuant to Rule 17a-5 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exch. Act. Rel. No. 34-10,787 (May 10, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 17799.
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The Consolidated Tape collected executed trade information for national
exchange-listed stocks in all the markets.29 NASD’s participation in the CTA plan at the
time came through the so-called “third market,” the trading of national exchange listed
securities by NASD market makers. At the same time, the SEC requested proposals for a
consolidated quotation system reporting quotes, the prices market makers were currently
offering to potential buyers and sellers. The NYSE, although resigned to the inter-market
trade reporting system, resisted the inter-market quotation system proposal vigorously,
arguing that the proposal was “beyond the authority of the SEC under the existing
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934” and that it was an illegal taking
of private property in violation of the due process clauses in the Constitution.30
The SEC’s answer to the NYSE’s charges came in the 1975 amendments.31
Concurrent with the SEC proposals, Congress was holding hearings on the structure of
the securities markets. Subcommittees of both houses of Congress issued comprehensive
reports containing conclusions and recommendations32 and the SEC had significant
influence in the committees. The subcommittee recommendations formed the basis of
legislative proposals that were enacted into law as the 1975 amendments.33
The 1975 amendments inserted Section 11A into the text of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Section 11A contains an explicit statutory commitment to the
establishment of a “national market system” and clarified and strengthened the SEC’s
authority to implement such a system. The 1975 amendments did not, however, define
the term national market system nor did they mandate the components of such a system.34
Congress did, however, specify basic underlying principles that were to govern the
creation of that system. They were
1. The economically efficient execution of transactions;
2. Fair competition among broker-dealers, among exchanges, and between
exchanges and other markets;
3. The ready availability of quotation and transaction information to brokerdealers and investors;
4. The ability of broker-dealers to execute orders in the best market; and
29

Eligible securities included all those listed on the two largest national exchanges, the NYSE and the
AMEX, and those admitted to unlisted trading privileges on a national exchange if they substantially meet
the listing requirements of the NYSE and the AMEX.
30
Blume, supra note 11, at 167. The NYSE continues to make the property argument today in various
forms.
31
See Senate Report No. 94-75 at 187 noting the NYSE position on the Consolidated tape plan.
32
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Securities Industry Study, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. 117-130 (1972); Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Securities Industry Study, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 89-135
(1973).
33
For a history of the 1975 Amendments see Harvey A. Rowen, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975:
A Legislative History, 3 Sec. Reg. L. J. 329 (1976). An amusing anecdote is the cause of the failure of the
legislation to pass in 1975. A key proponent of the bill had a dentist appointment that he would not miss
and the legislation failed in the House Rules Committee, 6 yes, 6 no, and 1 not voting. Id. at 342.
34
See Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Report to Accompany S. 249, S. Rept.
No. 94-75, 94th cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975).
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5. The opportunity, consistent with the other goals, for investors to execute
orders without the participation of a dealer.35
As noted in the Committee reports, Congress passed the amendments with a
scathing assessment of the condition of the national markets at the time. The House
report, for example, condemned the markets’ “stunted and distorted” evolutionary
process and technological obsolescence that resulted in “misallocations of capital,
widespread inefficiencies, and potentially harmful fragmentation of trading markets.”36
As noted in the House report, Congress’s solution was to “enhance competition [among
trading markets] and to allow economic forces, interacting within a fair regulatory field,
to arrive at appropriate variations of practices and services.”37 Congress made it very
clear that it did not want to pre-determine an outcome for the competition; it did not want
to favor one trading market over another.
Neither the markets themselves nor the broker-dealer participant in these markets
themselves should be forced into a single mold. Market centers should compete
and evolve according to their own natural genius and all actions to compel
uniformity must be measured and justified as necessary to accomplish the salient
purposes of the Securities and Exchange Act, assure the maintenance of fair and
orderly markets and to provide price protection for the orders of investors.38
In the Senate report there was a similar sense of regulatory humility:
This is not to suggest that under S. 249 the SEC would have either the
responsibility or the power to operate as an “economic czar” for the development
of a national market system. Quite the contrary, for a fundamental premise of the
bill is that the initiative for the development of the facilities of a national market
system must come from private interests and will depend upon the vigor of
competition within the securities industry as broadly defined.39
During the hearings, the NYSE argued that the legislation include a provision
requiring all trading in exchange listed securities be confined to registered exchanges,
statutorily eliminating the third market. The prohibition made it into the Senate version
of the bill. The SEC and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department opposed the
provision and carried the day40 but only after agreeing to a statutory provision that gave
the SEC the power to eliminate the third market on specified factual findings.41 The
SEC, fortunately, has never exercised the power.
35

Securities and Exchange Act, Section 11A(a)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. 78k-1(a)(1)(C).
House Report No. 94-123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975, at 49-50. See also Senate Report No. 94-75, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1975, at 1.
37
Id. at 50.
38
Id. See also Senate Report at 7 (“it is not the intention of the bill to force all markets for all securities
into a single mold.”)
39
Senate Report at 12.
40
Id. at 338.
41
Section 11A(a)(3)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78k-1(a)(3)(A). The SEC had
to find that the third market “affected [the fairness or orderliness of the markets in listed securities] contrary
36
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Congress anticipated that the core component of a national market system would
be through an electronic communication linkage of existing markets.42 In oftenunderestimated provisions added in Section 11A by the 1975 amendments, subsections
(b) and (c)(1) and (2), Congress empowered the SEC to register and regulate “securities
information processor[s].”43 The subsections on information processors, with numerous
divisions, make up over one-half the total statutory language added by the 1975
amendments to the 34 Act. The comparison of this length and detail with the single
sentence in (c)(4) on anticompetitive practices, which attracts the bulk of academic
commentary on the legislation, is telling.44
In subsection (b) Congress requires securities information processors to register
with the SEC unless a processor is not an “exclusive processor of any information with
respect to quotations for or transactions in securities”45 (and the SEC has not found it
necessary to register non-exclusive processors). Congress knew, given the SEC version
of a Consolidated Tape Plan already in the start up stages when the legislation passed,
that there might be only one dominating cross-market information processor. Congress
implied in (b), however, that if competing processors did appear on the scene, the SEC
could substantially lighten its regulations.
In the reports that accompanied the legislation, Congress referred to an exclusive
cross-market information processor as a “public utility” that “should be regulated
accordingly.”46 The Senate report also noted that an exclusive central information
processor “should not be under the control or domination of any particular market
center.”47
Implicit in these comments and the language of the statute itself is an
unmistakable Congressional preference for competing last sale and quotation inter-market
reporting services. This preference has never been realized. Indeed, from what I can tell,
competing systems had never been mentioned in any SEC public initiatives or releases
to the public interest or the protection of investors,” that no rule on any exchange “impairs the ability of
any dealer to solicit or effect transactions … or unreasonably restricts competition among dealers ” in listed
securities, and that “the maintenance or restoration of fair and orderly markets in such securities may not be
assured through other lawful means.”
42
See, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 31, at 3. There was a mild preference for auction-type trading. See
Securities and Exchange SEC, Development of National Market System, Exch. Act. Rel. No. 34-14416
(Feb. 1, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 4354, at 4356. See also Section 11A(c)(3) of the 34 Act (empowering the SEC
to abolish the third market if such trades are contrary to the “public interest or the protection of investors”).
43
The 1975 amendments added a definition of a securities information processor to Section 3(a)(22)(A) of
the 34 Act. A securities information processor is any person engaged “in the business of (a) collecting,
processing, or preparing for distribution or publication, or assisting, participating in, or coordinating the
distribution or publication of, information with respect to transactions in or quotations for any security
(other than an exempted security) or (b) distributing or publishing (by means of a ticker tape, a
communications network, a terminal display device, etc.) on a current and continuing basis information
with respect to such transactions or quotations.”
44
E.g., Macey, supra note 7.
45
Section 11A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78k-1(b)(1).
46
Senate Report 94-75 at 11; Conference Report 94-229 at 93.
47
See Senate Report 94-75 at 11; Conference Report 94-229 at 93.
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until 2004, when it was considered and rejected.48 We are left today with only one intermarket reporting system for trades, begun in mid 1975, and only one inter-market
reporting system for quotations, started in 1978.
The statute’s registration provisions on securities information processors also
enabled the SEC to gather information necessary to the application, hear complaints and
directed the SEC to grant the registration if the SEC finds that the processor “is so
organized, and has the capacity, as to be able to assure the prompt, accurate, and reliable
performance of its functions…comply with the provisions of this title and the rules and
regulations hereunder, carry out its functions in a manner consistent with the purposes of
this section, and, insofar as it is acting as an exclusive processor, operate fairly and
efficiently.”49
Note what is missing in the legislation. Nowhere in the legislation is a mention of
an inter-market order routing and execution system.50 Indeed, Congress, as is evident in
the express language of the statute on securities information processors, assumed that the
securities information processors would convey only last sale transaction data and market
quotations. There is no mention of an order routing or execution function for the
information processors. Even the title “securities information processors” conveys the
sense that Congress was not sanctioning or encouraging electronic order routing and
execution systems. And one can read the various goals stated in subsection (a)(1)
consistently: The statutory goal in subsection (a)(1) of “brokers executing investors’
orders in the best market” does not require a single centralized market, but only that
brokers have public information on all available markets.51
The omission of any language on order routing in the 1975 statute is notable in
light of the SEC’s prior 1973 Policy Statement that had proposed order routing and
execution rules. It is no answer therefore, to claim, as some do, that technology was so
unsophisticated in 1975 that Congress could not have anticipated an inter-market order
routing system similar to what is possible today and, therefore, that new advances in
48

See text at notes 79-87 below.
Section 11A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 78k-1(b)(3).
50
There is some evidence against the statement in the text. One can find some references in the
Congressional Committee Reports to a “centralized” trading mechanism. E.g., Senate Report No. 75, 94th
cong., 1st Sess. at 17. The Senate Report does not, however, state that the SEC ought to be authorized to
develop such a mechanism and the statute changed the language of “central” market system to “national”
market system, a much less intrusive concept. Critics could also point to language in the statute itself,
quoted above, gives as a goal the “opportunity for investor’s orders to be executed without the participation
of a dealer.” Some could argue that this assumes a centralized NMS. I disagree. Note that in the statute
the language of a central market system was replaced by a national market system. The change is
significant. Moreover, the goal of minimizing the role intermediaries could be achieved in a system that
has multiple market centers, as long as some of the centers are automated ECNs that allow customers to
interact directly with each other or some are auction exchanges in which those in the crowd interact with
each other.
51
Some claim that a “best execution” obligation, found in the statutory language, is a key concept of the
national market system. Section 11A(a)(1)(D). See Poser, supra note 8, at 911. The term refers to the
common law duty of an agent to obtain for a customer the best price discoverable in the exercise of
reasonable diligence. See Opper v Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d, 367
F.2d 157 (2d Cir.).
49
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communication technology require the SEC, authorized under the statutes’ open-ended
grants of authority, to fashion modern, adaptive rules. Order routing proposals were
floating around at the time of the legislation that are not all that dissimilar to those
proposed today. Moreover, the SEC had its first inter-market order routing system in
place only three years later, by 1978.
Finally, the change in language from a central market system as proposed in the
early ‘70s SEC reports to a national market system as is found in the legislation is
significant. Consistent with the Committee reports, a national market system has room
for many competitive trading centers. A central market system concept, on the other
hand, could justify an extreme centralization of orders under one universal routing and
execution system.
The SEC’s initiatives on order routing and centralized execution
systems,52 seem to depend for their authorization under the 1975 amendments on the
definition of a single term, “linking,” from in the legislation in Section 11A(a)(1)(D).
The Section calls for the “linking of all markets for qualified securities through
communication and data processing facilities” to “foster efficiency, enhance competition,
increase the information available to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate offsetting
of investor’s orders, and contribute to best execution of such orders.”53 Do these
provisions empower the SEC to establish mandatory order routing and execution
systems? If so, it is a slender reed of support, indeed.
One could also argue, persuasively in my view as it is more consistent with the
history and language of the 1975 amendments, that Congress intended for the SEC to link
the markets through information processing only -- exchanges of data on transactions and
quotations -- and did not intend the SEC to link the markets though government
mandated order routing and execution systems. Under this vision, individual markets and
market makers could choose to route orders to each other but their decision to do so and
the mechanism of choice for doing so would not be at the government’s direction. The
decision to “offset…orders” and the obligation of “best execution” remains with the local
markets and is not a call for an automatic centralized order routing and execution
system.54
Similarly there is no express direction in the 1975 amendments that the SEC
specify and approve the details of an inter-market information processor’s operations and
how individual markets interact with a central processor. I recognize that a sympathetic
52

See the discussion of the ITS or its stronger alternatives, a black box, CLOB or common message switch
in the next section.

53

Section 11A(a)(1)(D), 15 U.S.C. 78k-1(a)(1)(D). One could also point to Section 11A(c)(1)(e) that
empowers the SEC to assure that all exchange members, brokers and dealers “transmit and direct orders …
consistent with the establishment of a national market system.” The section assumes the goals of
subsection (a)(1) in defining the concept of a national market system, however.
54
In this regard note the language that authorizes the SEC to “facilitate” offsetting orders and to
“contribute” to best execution. This is not a Congressional direction to establish a centralized mechanism
for effecting offsetting orders and best execution.
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court may find such power, erroneously in my view, in other provisions, on the SEC’s
authority to deal with how information processors interact with the various trading
market centers.55 One could read these examples, consistent with the legislative history,
however, to imply much more modest scope and purpose for SEC inter-market system
regulations than the SEC has established.56

The SEC’s Exercise of Its New Powers Under the 1975 Amendments
The SEC, in the thirty years since the 1975 amendments, has, in my view, taken
the broad, sweeping, cosmic grant of authority in the legislation to implement a national
market system and, amazingly, managed to exceed it by a considerable margin.57 There
are three overarching regulatory failures and a host of specific ones. I will focus on the
overarching failures and leave the specific ones to other authors.58

55

The SEC did get broad rule-making power over processors in subsection (c)(1):
(A) to prevent the use, distribution or publication of Fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative
information…, (B) assure prompt, accurate, reliable, and fair collection, processing, distribution,
and publication of information…, (C) assure that all …processors may…obtain on fair and
reasonable terms such information with respect to quotations and transactions in such securities as
is collected, processed, or prepared for distribution or publication by any exclusive processor...,
(D) assure that all exchange members, brokers, dealers … and all other persons may obtain on
terms which are not unreasonably discriminatory such information…, (E) assure that all exchange
members, brokers and dealers transmit and direct orders for the purchase or sale of qualified
securities in a manner consistent with the establishment and operation of a national market system;
and (F) assure equal regulation of all markets for qualified securities and all exchange members,
brokers, and dealers…

And subsection (c)(2) also empowers the SEC to require any person “to report such purchase or sale to a
registered securities information processor, national securities exchange, or registered securities association
and require such processor…to make appropriate distribution and publication of information with respect to
such purchase or sale.”
I view these as anti-Fraud and anti-restraint of trade provisions, not as general. In support of my
view note that the Senate report listed as examples of legitimate SEC rules under these sections “the hours
of operation of any type or quotation system, trading halts, what and how information is displayed and
qualifications for the securities to be included on any tape or within any quotation system.” Senate Report
at 189.
56
One could, of course, argue on the other side that the “what and how information is displayed” language
in the Senate Report language noted, supra, in note 39, for example, justifies detailed SEC rules on each
systems interaction with each covered trading market. I believe the spirit of the passage is to the contrary.
57
I admit that federal courts could find statements in the legislative history that justify, effectively,
complete deference to the SEC. See, e.g., Conference Report No. 94-229 at 92 (“The Senate Bill [which
the Conference adopted] relied on an approach designed to provide maximum flexibility to the SEC and the
securities industry in giving specific content to the general concept of the nation market system.”) I submit
that the delegation in the 1975 Amendments has some limits, however, inherent in the language and history
of the legislation.
58
See, e.g., Borrelli, supra note 6; Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of
Current Regulatory and Structural Issues and A Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 Col. Bus.
L. Rev. 399.

12
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art12

The three overarching failures are: First, the SEC’s complete absence of any
effort to facilitate competition among cross-market securities information processors.
There is, and has always been, only one exclusive, primary information processor for
transaction data (the CTA) and one for quotation data (the CQS). Second, the SEC did
not have a mandate from Congress to force the markets to participate in an inter-market
trade execution system. Congress did not authorize the creation of an Intermarket
Trading System (ITS) and its potential progeny (a CLOB system, for example). And
third, Congress did not intend for the SEC to so pervasively micro-manage the details of
the behavior of the participant markets in a national market system. Independent
computerized markets have been the recent objects here; the SEC is attempting to limit
their habitat.
Each of the failures is discussed sequentially below.
The Consolidated Data Dissemination Systems: The CTA, CQ, and Nasdaq UTP Plans
The first part of a national, consolidated information system on the price and
volume in actual securities sales, was, as noted above, created by a joint-industry task
force in 1972. The Consolidated Tape Association (CTA) Plan, up and running in its
experimental stages even before the passage of the 1975 amendments, has continued and
is now registered as an information processor under the amendment’s new Section
11A(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act.59 The SEC eventually replaced old Rule 17a15 with new Rule 11A3-1 in 1980.60
The Consolidated Tape (CT), run by the Consolidated Tape Association,
continues to collect and disseminate trade information in all exchange-traded stock
(including listed stock and stock admitted to unlisted trading privileges). All national and
regional exchanges and the NASD, as owner of the Nasdaq,61 participate in the plan. The
Consolidated Tape provides “last sale” information, or the price at which the last
transaction in a covered stock occurred on participating markets. A separate reporting
plan operated by Nasdaq, the “Nasdaq System,” provides transaction data on all Nasdaq
securities.
The CT uses technology supplied by SIAC, a subsidiary of both the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). A board manages
CTA’s operations. Until 1980, the NYSE and the AMEX had two votes each on the
board and the other four members (Chicago, Pacific, Philadelphia and NASD) had one.62
Moreover, until 1980 both the NYSE and AMEX had effective veto power over plan
amendments. In 1980, the CTA added two new members (Boston and Cincinnati, now
59

Notice of Application for Registration, SEC. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-11779 (Oct. 30, 1975), 40 Fed.Reg.
215; Order Granting Registration as Securities Information Processors, SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-12035
(Jan. 22, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 4372.
60
See Collection and Dissemination of Transaction Reports and Last Sale Data, Exch. Act Rel. No. 16,589
(Feb. 19,1980).
61
NASD market makers trading in exchange listed stock, the “third market,” report under the plan.
62
Consolidated Tape Plan, Order Approving Amendments to Plan, SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-16983 (July
16, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 49414.
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National) and both of the national exchanges lost their extra vote and their veto power.
The Plan, with the addition of the Chicago Board Options Exchange in 1991,63 now has
nine members. 64 No amendments are “effective” unless executed by each of the Plan
participants, however.
The next SEC initiative involved a consolidated system for disseminating quotes,
bids and offers for securities, by national exchanges. The SEC established a quotation
reporting system shortly after the adoption of the 1975 amendments and the
implementation of the trade reporting system, CTA Plan. The SEC adopted Rule
11Ac1-1 in January of 1978, requiring the public dissemination of quotations by
exchanges and NASD market makers.65 The NYSE and the AMEX filed a plan for a
Consolidated Quotation System (CQS) with the SEC on July 25 of that same year.66
The plan, creating a Consolidated Quotation Association (CQA) that while technically
separate from the CTA has the same membership, is the basis for the CQS in place
today. The CQS provides quotation information from all participating markets for
exchange-listed stocks.67
The SEC standardized the trade and quote reporting requirements by system
participants in 1980.68 With standardization came SEC control over the minute details
of trade and quote reporting requirements. Control over quote reporting in particular
necessarily gave the SEC significant influence over the details of how each market
trading center had to structure its basic trading. In the 2004 proposed Regulation NMS
the SEC seeks to take its power over quotations standardization and, in the new ‘TradeThrough” Rules discussed below,69 dictate dramatic changes in market structural.
In 1981, the SEC adopted Rule 11Aa2-1, introducing the concept of National
Market System (NMS) securities.70 The initiative extended the consolidated reporting
system from exchange-listed securities to a selected segment of heavily traded
securities in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. The Rule, as amended in 1987,
identifies a class of securities eligible for inclusion in the national market system.
Exchange traded or NASD traded securities subject to a “reporting plan” approved by
the SEC are designated NMS securities and subject to specifically tailored transaction
63

Order Approving the Fifteenth Amendment to the Consolidated Tape Association Plan, SEC Exch. Act
Rel. No. 34-28808 (Jan. 28, 1991), 56 Fed. Reg. 3124.
64
Current CTA plan participants are Amex (American Stock Exchange), BSE (Boston Stock Exchange),
CBOE (Chicago Board Options Exchange, CHX (Chicago Stock Exchange), NSX (National Stock
Exchange), NASD, NYSE (New York Stock Exchange), PCX (Pacific Stock Exchange) and Phlx
(Philadelphia Stock Exchange). See SEC Rel. No. 34-48987 (Dec. 23, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 75661 (Dec. 31,
2003).
65
Dissemination of Quotations for Reported Securities, Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-14,415 (Jan. 26, 1978), 43
Fed. Reg. 4342 (Feb. 1, 1978).
66
Temporary Order, SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-15009 (Aug 7, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 34851.
67
Network A is for NYSE listed securities; Network B is for securities listed on the Amex and other
national exchanges.
68
Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 34-16590 (Feb. 13, 1980), 445 Fed. Reg. 12391 (Feb.19,
1980).
69
See text at notes 132-140.
70
Designation of National Market System Securities, SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-17,549 (Feb. 17, 1981).
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and quotation reporting rules. In complying with the Rule, the NASD designated
securities as Nasdaq/NMS securities and created a distinct national market segment of
Nasdaq.71 The Nasdaq System now provides quotation information for Nasdaq stocks
under a third plan, known as the Nasdaq UTP Plan.72 Recently NASD also opened,
under an order from the SEC, an “alternative display facility” (ADF) for ECNs to
provide quotes and report trades on Nasdaq stock.73
There are currently three “Networks” for disseminating market information on
NMS stocks: Network A securities are those listed on the NYSE; Network B securities
are those listed on AMEX and the regional exchanges; and Network C securities are
traded on Nasdaq.74 For each security included the networks offer national best bid and
offer (NBBO) with prices, sizes and market center identification, best bids and offers
from each participating market also with prices, sizes and market center identification,
and consolidated trade reports (last sale information).75 Each network has a monopoly
over the consolidated, national reporting of covered securities.
The CT, CQ and Nasdaq Systems all provide for the collection of fees from
vendors and subscribers for the dissemination of market data and for the allocation of the
revenue among members. Vendors enter into contracts with the networks and pay access
and administrative fees. The subscribers, typically broker/dealers or institutional
investors, receive information from the vendors in exchange for a fee that the vendor then
passes back to the network. The fees and how the fees are shared among members are
subject to SEC approval and a source of constant attention and tension.76
The struggle over fees is a necessary part of the SEC “public utility” oversight of
exclusive securities information processors. Just as a state public utility regulates the fees
electric and gas companies charge retail customers, the SEC regulates the fees the CTA,
CQA and Nasdaq charge vendors. With no easy analogies to the prices in competitive
markets, the SEC has, for years, struggled with a theoretical and practical basis for such
71

Order Approving Proposed Designation Plan for National Market System Securities, SEC Exch. Act Rel.
34-18,399 (Jan.7, 1982). Nasdaq SmallCap securities are not covered by the NASD plan and are therefore
not considered NMS securities.
72
Under the Nasdaq UTP Plan, NASD administers a CQ, Network C for unlisted, but qualified NASD
securities, so called NMS securities. The quotes are included in the CQ Plan data stream. See Order, SEC
Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-16518 (Jan. 22, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 6521. The Nasdaq System also includes
transaction and quotation information for Nasdaq Smallcap securities and other OTC securities that are not
NMS.
73
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change
by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. To Extend Operation of NASD's Alternative Display
Facility on a Pilot Basis, SEC Exch. Act Rel. 34-47663 (April 10, 2003). The ECNs cannot quote
exchange listed stock on the ADF, however.
74
Consolidated Tape Association, SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-44615 (Aug. 6, 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 41058.
75
See SEC Rel. No. 43-49325 at 83.
76
E.g., Approval of an Amendment to the Consolidated Tape Plan Establishing Non-Professional Fees,
SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34- 20386 (Nov. 28, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 53616; Order Approving the Fifteenth
Amendment to the Consolidated Tape Association Plan, SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-28808 (Jan. 28,
1991)., 56 Fed. Reg. 3124. See also, NASD v SEC, 801 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(Instinet contested
Nasdaq fees).
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fee calculations.77 The disputes over fees by participants finally led the SEC in 2004 to
consider whether or not to break the consolidated network monopolies. Led to the brink
of change, the SEC balked however. This history is telling.
In 1999 the SEC, seeking to quell intense squabbling among market centers,
proposed a “flexible, cost- based” system for regulating market data fees.78 But what
costs are included? Are regulatory and surveillance costs included? The NYSE, claiming
an ownership interest in the data, argued in response to the initiative that it should be free
to set its own fees and that the CTA should be dissolved. Discount brokers argued that
the fees were excessive and greatly exceed the costs of gathering the information and
discriminate against online firms and that the fees were used to improperly fund
surveillance costs. Both sides used creative accounting calculations in their arguments.
An advisory committee created in 2000 to develop recommendations on the
issues, after eight hearings, ended in 2001 by rejecting the SEC’s cost-based initiative
with tepid support for status quo standards and calculations.79 A majority of a badly split
committee, however, supported a dramatic change, a move to “competing information
processors,” more in line with the 1975 Congress’s desires.80 81 In the competing
consolidators model, each major market center82 would be allowed to separately establish
its own fees, enter into and administer its own market data contracts, and provide its own
data distribution facility. Data vendors (competing consolidators) could purchase data
from the individual market centers, consolidate the data and distribute it to investors and
other data users. A minority group of the Committee favored radical change, a
deconsolidation model that would eliminate the consolidated date system entirely.83
In 2004, three years later, the SEC, in proposed Regulation NMS, accepted many
of the Advisory Committee technical recommendations for the three networks but
rejected the Committee majority’s recommendation for competing consolidators and
rejected the minority group’s deconsolidation model.

77

See Borrelli, supra note 6, at 903 – 905.
E.g., Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exch. Act Rel. 34-42,208 (Dec. 9, 1999) at
11-12, 64 Fed. Reg. 70613.
79
E.g., Mary Schroeder, Market Data Report Backs Multiple Consolidators, Sec. Indus. News, Oct. 1,
2001. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Market Information: A Blueprint of Responsible Change
(Sept. 14, 2001), (available on www.sec.gov).
80
E.g., Market Data Committee Supports Competition, Sec. Indus. News, Oct. 8, 2001(there were two
distinct minority views).
81
In 2003, the Nasdaq added fuel to the flame when it petitioned the SEC for recognizing surveillance costs
as legitimate deductions from data revenue E.g., Isabelle Clary, “ Nasdaq Seeks Uniform Rules,” Sec.
Indus. News, May 5, 2003. This is a Nasdaq solution to its belief that it bears a disproportionately large part
of the regulatory costs for the national market in Nasdaq stocks without adequate compensation. The
Nasdaq has asked the SEC to aggregate all markets’ regulation costs and to deduct these costs from the data
collection revenue. Since the Nasdaq has over $80 million a year in costs, far larger than any other
participant, the effect is to increase the Nasdaq portion of the collected vendor revenues.
82
Technically, those centers that were self-regulatory organizations (SROs). SEC Rel. No. 34-49325 at 85.
83
Advisory Committee Report, supra note 79, section VII.B.1.
78
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In rejecting the deconsolidation model the SEC noted that the problem of market
power by some market centers such as the NYSE in creating quote and trade information
would led to monopoly like fees. It also worried about the confusion that a lack of
standardization would inflict on retail investors.84 In rejecting the “competing
consolidators” model, the SEC projected that the model would cause investors to pay
higher fees for lower quality information.85 The information would be lower quality
because of a potential lack of uniformity of data presentation among the competing
consolidators; the information would cost more because the dominant market centers
would raise their fees to all the consolidators unless the SEC intervenes.86 SEC
intervention would require the regulation of ten market center fees schedules rather than
the three of the networks in the consolidated system.87
Reading the legislative history and language of the 1975 amendments and
comparing it to the CTA, CQS and Nasdaq Plan one cannot help but be struck by the
resistance on the part of the SEC to do what Congress clearly seemed to prefer. Congress
had hoped, first, that there would be multiple primary security information processors
and, second, that if there was only one, it would not be owned by the major markets that
it serviced. The SEC carried out neither of the wishes nor has even attempted to do so.88
One has to ask: Why is there not at least one non-market center controlled
processor that collects and integrates primary transaction and quote data from individual
market centers and market makers? There are several new, creative private secondary
information services.89 The SEC had the power to facilitate such arrangements and the
power to require the market centers and market makers to provide them with the
appropriate information.90
At the root of the SEC’s concerns in rejecting the competing consolidators model
is the market power of the primary market centers, the NYSE and the Nasdaq in
particular, to charge excessive fees and the lack of objective standards for the
Commission in evaluating fees across the centers. If the SEC can, as it now does, set fees
for each of the three networks, step one, and then allocate those fees among individual
participating market centers using a complex formula, step two, one should ask why the
same fee allocation formula mechanics (a complicated algorithm based on a mix of
trading activity and NBBO quotes) could not be used to establish primary level fee
regulation. Just combine step one and step two; calculate a total fee for data
84

SEC Rel. No. 34-50870 at 23, citing the discussion in SEC Rel. No. 34-49325 at 84-87.
SEC Rel. No. 34-49325 at 86.
86
Id. at 86. The SEC also rejected a “hybrid model” in which the networks would continue to disseminate
only NBBO information. Other trade and quote information would be disseminated by individual market
centers. Id. at 86-87.
87
Id. at 143-144.
88
A cynic might argue that by creating a “public utility” that had to be closely watched, the SEC
augmented its power as a regulator.
89
The successful Lava Trading Inc.’s Colorbook service is an example. See Consolidating Fragments,
Traders Mag., April 1, 2003 (interview with Rich Korhammer, Lava COS).
90
For a general discussion see Joel Seligman, Rethinking Securities Markets: the SEC Advisory Committee
on Market Information and the Future of the National Market System, 57 Bus. Lawyer 637 (Feb.
2002)(Dean Seligman was the Chairman of the advisory committee).
85
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dissemination on any one stock and allocate the fees among the markets that trade the
stock.
The deeper problem, however, is one of antitrust enforcement. The SEC has, as
noted below, by its regulations facilitated the creation and the entrenchment of market
centers with dominate market power over certain securities. The SEC should have long
ago more robustly employed fundamental antitrust principles in its market regulations
and their enforcement. But it gets worse. By requiring one or more consolidators to
include all market centers in their data package, as the SEC now does, and/or by
requiring broker/dealers to find the best price across all markets for customers, as the
SEC wants to do in Regulation NMS,91 the SEC necessarily exposes retail investors to
monopolistic pricing problems from every market center, large or small. A mandatory
inclusion rule at either the consolidator or broker/dealer level makes each market center a
monopolist with respect to the provisions its own trade and quote data.92 By creating the
network monopolies, or ten monopolies under the new proposals (every market center
becomes a monopoly), the SEC can claim authority over rigid fee structure control -- in
our best interest, of course.
The answer may lie in less SEC control, not more. The minority report of the
Advisory Committee that recommended a deconsolidation model had a partial answer.
The minority recommended suspending the requirement that market centers work
together to provide consolidated data, and suspending the requirement that data
purchasers purchase data from all markets, opening up the markets raw data competition.
Competitive forces would determine data products, fees and market center revenues. The
other half of the answer is to address the problem of market power by the larger market
centers. The SEC, in tandem with a deconsolidation model, would have to loosen its
other market structure regulations that limit competition among market centers, using
basic antitrust analysis as it guide, to make the model work. Two of these SEC
initiatives, for example, would have to loosen the trade-through rule and the regulation of
ECNs, our next topics below. A deconsolidation model would work only if it were part
of a boarder package of proposed rules that open up market competition among market
centers in the trading of any given security.
But the SEC, rather than loosening its control over market structure has proposed,
in Regulation NMS, to tighten it up. And in tightening up control over market structure
the SECs reinforces its claim that it must necessarily control data dissemination and set
fees. See how the argument works? It is circular and a tightening spiral at that. If and
when SEC Regulation NMS is put it place, we will be so far down the road to a
government structured secondary trading market that we may find it virtually impossible
to ever turn back.
Trade Execution Among Market Centers: The Inter-market Trading System (ITS)

91

See the text, infra notes 132-140, on the SEC’s proposed Trade-Through and Access Rules below.
Cf. Bob Greifeld, Millions of Momentary Monopolies, Wall. St. J., Dec. 8, 2004 at A12 (making a
similar point on the proposed access rules).
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After Congress’s 1975 amendments to the 34 Act, the SEC also moved forward
on its earlier proposal for some form of an electronic communications network that
would “link” the major markets. The word “link”, which could refer only to data
exchanges, has come to mean something much more -- that participants in one market
can execute orders, buy and sell securities, on another. On January 26, 1978, the SEC
issued a statement calling for, among other things, the prompt development of a
comprehensive market linkage and order routing system to permit the efficient
transmission of orders for qualified securities among the various market centers.93 In the
1978 release, the SEC floated several proposals for a centralized order routing scheme -a central execution system with strict price and time priority for every order (known by
some as “the black box”),94 a Consolidated Limit Order Book (the CLOB),95 and wanted
to settle, at minimum, for a “common message switch.”96
Existing trading markets resisted vigorously the proposals and, with the threat of
unilateral SEC action in the background, negotiated a compromise, the Inter-market
Trading System or ITS.97 The NYSE, seeking a compromise that would preserve their
superior market position, proposed the ITS, in which members of the various exchanges
had reciprocal trading privileges in each other’s markets.98 The ITS permits a dealer on
one market to transmit an order to another when a dealer in the other market is displaying
a better price quote. The ITS began on a pilot basis on April 17, 1978, with the NYSE
and the Philadelphia Stock Exchanges trading eleven stocks.99 By mid-1978 four other
exchanges had joined the system and gradually more stocks were added. 100 The
Cincinnati (now National) Stock Exchange joined in 1981, NASD joined in 1982 and the
Chicago Board Options Exchange joined in 1991.101
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Development of a National Market System, SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-14416 (Jan. 26, 1978), 43 Fed.
Reg.4354 (Feb.1, 1978). See also Dale Oesterle, Securities Markets Regulation: The Time to Move to a
Market-Based Approach, Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, No. 374 (June 21, 2000).
94
See Policy Statement on the Structure of a Central Market System (1973). The SEC proposed a central
location where all orders for one stock converged. The central computer would automatically match and
execute orders when prices matched, giving price and time priority to orders.
95
See Request for Proposals for a Consolidated Limit Order Book, SEC Exch. Act Rel. 34-12159 (March
2, 1976). In a CLOB there would be a single national book in which all orders for a given stock at a given
price would be entered. A consolidated limit-order book would have created major disruptions in the
structure of the trading markets and the NYSE specialists would have lost significant business. See Blume,
supra note 11, at 175.
96
See Development of a National Market System, supra note 93, at 4358. With a common message switch,
a computer would automatically route any order to the market displaying the best prices. See Blume, supra
note 11, at 177.
97
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-14661 (April 14, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 17419 (April 24,
1978)(initial temporary approval) and No. 34- 19456 (Jan 27, 1883), 48 Fed. Reg. 4938 (Feb. 3, 1983)(final
permanent approval).
98
See Blume, supra note 11, at 177.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
All national securities exchanges and the NASD are members of the ITS except the new International
Securities Exchanges, which trades options not covered by the plan. SEC Rel. No. 34-49325 at 162, note
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As initially drafted, the ITS did not provide for automatic execution of orders
across markets. As now operated, however, the ITS requires each plan participant to
provide electronic access to its best bid or offer quotes to other participants and to
provide an automated mechanism for routing orders (“commitments”) to reach the
displayed quotes.102 In 1981, the ITS adopted a rule that changed the essential nature of
the ITS system from a voluntary execution system, in which a market maker in one
market could choose to execute trades in other markets, to a mandatory execution system,
in which a market marker in one market center, under some circumstances, was forced to
execute trades in other markets. The rule, now known as the controversial “tradethrough rule,”103 requires that a market maker whose price is inferior to the National Best
Bid or Offer (NBBO) price—and who has a customer market order—either match the
better price or make a “commitment to trade” on the market posting the better price.104 In
other words, it is an illegal “trade-through” when a member of an ITS participant market
center initiates a purchase (or sale) on the exchange of a security covered by the ITS at a
price that is higher (or lower) than the price at which the security is quoted at the time of
the transaction in another ITS participant market center.105
Frustrating SEC grand plans for the system, the ITS trade volume has always been
inconsequential, however, at never more than three and one-half percent of the total trade
volume on the member markets.106 This should not be a surprise as the rule requires
market makers in one market to give trades to their competitors in another market, with a
resultant loss in the first market makers’ fees and in her markets’ network fee allocations.
Rather that route trades to a competitor, market makers in one market with inferior quotes
to another market usually just match (execute at) the better prices or refuse the trade.
Most of the ITS trades that do occur are in one direction, routed by the smaller markets to
the NYSE. There have been constant rumblings over time that markets posting the best
prices on ITS get ignored by market makers located in other competing markets.107
The SEC and ITS board have been frequently at odds at how the inter- market
system should function. Again, this should not be a surprise. The SEC envisions an
expanding role for the ITS as a precursor to an integrated central trading market and the
participating members of the ITS seek to use the body as a classic guild, entrenching
historic market segmentation. For example, SEC and the ITS board fought for twentyfive years over mechanics of the addition of the NASD to the ITS. The Nasdaq had
developed an automatic order execution system, the Computer Assisted Execution
102
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System (CAES), and any linkage of ITS to CAES meant that orders in listed stocks could
be automatically executed away from the established exchanges. The SEC, in 1999, after
the ITS board had once again refused to budge on the matter (it operated on a unanimity
voting requirement), itself ordered the ITS to include a linkage to CAES in all listed
securities.108 The breach threatens to turn into a flood as the ITS has now admitted a
computerized electronic facility (known as an ECN for electronic communications
network or an ATS for alternative trading system109), Archipelago, and included “remote
specialists” on the regional exchanges.110
ECNs complain, however, that the NYSE uses the ITS structure and the SEC’s
rules to effectively block ECNs from executing trades in exchange listed shares.111 They
make two arguments. First ECNs using CAES must adapt to the outdated technology of
CAES and pay a hefty fee to a competitor, the Nasdaq, for the questionable privilege of
accessing the ITS system. Second, the ITS trade-through rule disables ECNs from
trading listed stock that is not exempted from the rule. ECNs cannot be programmed to
wait for exposure to non-automated auction markets such as the NYSE.112 ECNs
therefore floated, in 2002, a proposal to allow ECNs to quote listed securities on the
NASD’s Alternative Display Facility (ADF system), whose members are not subject to a
trade-through rule.113 Thus many of the ECNs do not trade ITS stocks or do so only if
there is a specialized exemption from the rule. ECNs can trade selected high-volume,
derivatively priced Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) (specifically QQQs, SPDRs and
Diamonds)114 or very small volume in a covered security.115
108

Adoption of Amendments to the Intermarket Trading System Plan to Expand the ITS/CAES Linkage to
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See Isabelle Clary, “SEC Extends ADF Pilot for Nasdaq Stocks Only,” Sec. Indus. News, April 21,
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Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-46428 (Aug. 2002), 67 Fed. Reg. 56607 (Sept 14, 2002). The rule
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By contrast, the Nasdaq UTP Plan does not contain a trade-through rule and,
despite SEC pressure,116 there is no intermarket trade-through rule on Nasdaq securities.
The result is that ECNs now dominate the trading market in Nasdaq securities. ECNs
continue, on the other hand, to have a very minor position in the trading markets for
exchange listed securities. In Regulation NMS, the SEC now seeks to impose a tradethrough rule on the Nasdaq.117 In so doing, as discussed in the next section, the SEC had
to satisfy the complaints of the ECNs, primarily by applying the rule only to quotations
that are immediately accessible through automatic execution.
The history of the evolution of the ITS is sobering, for it is the proverbial nose of
the camel under the tent. The SEC is using the ITS as a vehicle to develop, increment by
increment, a full-blown centralized trading system. Regulation NMS is the latest SEC
maneuver in this steady progression. Since 1972 the SEC has periodically repeated its
preference for strengthening the ITS system by asking for comments on stronger versions
of the system. In a 2000 Concept Release,118 for example, the SEC requested comments
on among other things a CLOB, a message switch with price and time priority, and an
order exposure rule modification for the ITS. I wrote in 2002 that “Some day the SEC
may get its way.”119 In Regulation NMS, the SEC has decided to go for broke with its
proposed “Access Rules.”120 With the Access Rules, the SEC has effectively proposed
turning the ITS into a surrogate CLOB.
To understand the current SEC proposals one first has to consider the SEC’s
historical flirtations with market centralization proposals. Advocates of centralized
markets tend to favor one of three particular arrangements. First, there are advocates of
the “black-box” approach. Devotees of that approach envision the single market to be
one all-encompassing computer trading system (sometimes referred to as a strict timepriority central limit order book, or " hard CLOB").121 Second, there are those who
favor a stronger overarching ITS with more stocks and more automatic routing and
execution.122 Enthusiasts argue that time priority can also be imposed on competing
115

ECNs are not required to follow the rule with respect to a covered security until they have 5% or more
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Professor Jeremy J. Siegel of the Wharton School of Business argues that the SEC should establish an
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Professor Siegel’s view seems to have piqued the SEC’s interest as Regulation NMS makes bid and ask
prices for ITS linked stocks available for all investors.
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markets by forcing all trading through a computerized message switch that monitors the
timing of quote updates and routes orders accordingly. And third, those in current
positions of superior market power, principally the NYSE, urge the SEC to consolidate
order flows of selected securities in specified markets. There are several versions of the
third position. Historically the NYSE consolidated order flow in listed stocks on its
exchange with internal no-compete rules; members of the exchange had to agree not to
trade listed shares off the exchange. With the loss of the rules and their remnants, the
NYSE now has urged the SEC to terminate the ITS system, recognizing that the NYSE
could easily maintain its dominate market position in listed shares if it was not required
to integrate with other markets.123 Modern versions of this proposal include a version
that would give corporations the right and power to list their shares on only one market,
the market of their choice.
Historically the SEC had flirted with version one, resisted version three, and
settled on version two, a growing ITS system. The concept of an overarching ITS does
have a certain superficial appeal. But, the ITS system shares many of the problems of
any self-regulatory organization (SRO) regime.124 The ITS, is itself, a combination of
otherwise independent trading markets.125 If all exchanges were required to belong to the
ITS, and the ITS maintained exclusive rules for membership and a dominant market
position, that system could easily become an anti-competitive combination of otherwise
independent competitors. One can make a good case for the proposition that in the past
the ITS system has been a major tool used by the national exchanges to stifle competition
in exchange-listed securities. When the SEC recently announced an initiative to give
NASD dealers full access to trading NYSE listed securities over the ITS, the SEC
Chairman commented that the change was “long overdue and, frankly, should have been
accomplished some time ago through the voluntary efforts” of the ITS membership.126
Currently, ECNs claim that the ITS’s trade-through rules are anti-competitive.127
Centralizing trading through a time-priority message switch -- that is, a modified
ITS -- raises all the same issues as centralizing trading in a central limit order book, the
CLOB version of the "black box" approach. It requires expensive new infrastructure and
bureaucracy, precludes competition and innovation, and leaves the market dependent on a
government-imposed technology. Moreover, a time-priority rule does not take into
account other attributes of the participating markets that are relevant to execution choice.
Another concern with time priority is that it prevents competition on factors other than
price. In other words, the trading market that is first in line gets the order, regardless of
whether other markets offer enhanced liquidity, faster or more reliable systems, lower
rates of failed trades, or better credit, to name a few of the many factors on which
markets compete today. Under a time-priority rule, the better markets will pressure the
123
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SEC to mandate rules that either “shape-up” or eliminate the sloppier markets -- a sure
recipe for ever more intrusive SEC micro-market regulation
What is the best ITS system? Surely the SEC ought not to be the final arbitrator
on these critical operation issues, nor should an exclusive trade association of all the oldline exchanges. It is questionable whether a SEC micro-managing the operating
characteristics of a super-ITS system will make the right technical decisions. For
example, the overarching ITS system as envisioned by many of its advocates would have
the same quote display problems that so bedeviled the SEC in its efforts to promulgate
Regulation ATS. Can participants quote different prices for different amounts? Would
traders be required to display their entire position or could they dribble out their sales?
Would all brokers have ITS access? Should strict time/price priority be enforced through
an ITS (option six in the SEC’s Concept Release on Market Fragmentation)?128 Should
an order exposure rule be applied through an ITS (option three in the SEC’s Concept
Release on Market Fragmentation)?129 If the answers do not accord with the desires of
large traders, those traders will go to London or Brussels unless the ITS system has
overwhelming market power, that is, a monopoly maintained through government
regulations.
The SEC’s proposed solution to the potential problems of a strengthened ITS is
contained in Regulation NMS. In the Regulation the SEC has offered a dramatic
restructuring of the national securities markets, using the ITS. In so doing, the SEC seeks
openly to regulate the ITS system as if it were a public utility. (We have already noted
above the public utility style regulation favored by the SEC in trade and quote
information dissemination. 130) In Regulation NMS the SEC seeks to create an all inclusive, market-dominant ITS and regulate it like a state public utility authority
128
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regulating water or electric service; the SEC will establish and approve changes in
membership criteria, fees and basic operational structure and procedures.
Proposed Regulation NMS contains five new initiatives; a new trade-though rule
for the ITS, new access rules for the CQ; a prohibition on quotes in fractions of a penny,
and a new method of allocating fees collected by consolidated data reporting services.131
Of the initiatives, the new trade-through and access rules are the most far reaching. The
trade-through rules offer three major changes132: First, trade-through protection is
extended to Nasdaq, covering all NMS stocks, to very large block trades and to very
small trades (100 share blocks). Second, the trade-through protection is limited to
automated trades, excluding quotations in manual markets. Third, the trade-through
protections may be extended to depth of book (DOB) quotations, quotations in any
market center that are inferior to the market’s best bid and offer (BBO), at the choice of
individual markets.133 To protect the integrity of the new trade-though rules, the SEC had
to, however, open up market access to the protected quotes on controlled fees. The
access rules therefore prohibits market centers from controlling their own membership;
the centers must accept all private links from even non-members on “non-discriminatory”
terms and at SEC proscribed fees ($.003 per share).134
These changes, if adopted, will restructure the market, effecting the most dramatic
changes since the passage of the New Deal legislation that put the markets under federal
regulation.135 Some changes will be predictable and many will not. There is heavy
speculation on who the “winners and losers” will be under the new rules.136 The SEC
Commissioners themselves split on the adoption of the rule.137
The floor brokers on the NYSE and Amex would appear to be the big losers as the
traditional open out-cry auction exchanges will be forced to automate a higher percentage
of their trades to get the benefit of trade-through rule protection. Moreover, modern
ECNs will be able to trade exchange-listed securities on an equal basis with the
exchanges for the first time in their young history. It may be the beginning of the end for
the manual auction market on these storied exchanges. NYSE seat prices hit a nine year
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low in January as a result of the anticipated changes.138 Other losers may include the
smaller ECNs trading NMS shares on Nasdaq139; they will lose order flow to the larger
markets in those shares. Consolidation of the automated markets trading Nasdaq shares
appears inevitable. Finally, all traditional market makers (specialists on the exchanges
and manual market makers on the NASD) will lose privileged access to quote
information if the DOB system is widely adopted.
The biggest winner under Regulation NMS will be the SEC, who has made a
permanent position of enhanced importance for itself; it will be the eight-hundred pound
gorilla of our trading markets.140 The NYSE and Nasdaq will become de facto operating
branches of the SEC.
The SEC’s various centralized order routing proposals, of which Regulation NMS
is the most current, share a common problem. A central market would be a governmentsponsored monopoly (or in more positive terms, a “public utility”) and it would be
resistant to innovation.141 At best, one ought to doubt whether the SEC has the foresight
to create a market that would be superior to one created by a more competitive process
among private parties. Nobody knows currently which, if any, of the proposed trading
market systems will prove best. The SEC is more likely than not to pick the wrong
system and trading will be less efficient than if it had been left to market forces.142 Or,
even if the SEC picks the correct system for the moment, it will be the wrong system for
tomorrow and difficult to change. At worst, the SEC will be captured and corrupted by
the interests behind whatever market manages to establish itself as the only game in
town.143
Some of the SEC’s most ardent critics unwittingly aided the SEC’s role as final
arbitrator of market structure. The SEC’s market-structure-by- mandate satisfies few in
the industry. Unfortunately, many of the SEC most vocal critics favor an even more
centralized market on which all stock of any issuer can be traded.144 Those who advocate
these solutions bemoan the dangers of “market fragmentation.” They argue that only
138
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such a market will be orderly, liquid, and deep, with narrow price spreads. Moreover,
only in a single market will traders know with certainty that they have received the best
executions of their orders and that no one else offers a better price.
Advocates of a centralized trading system often argue from “tension” between
competition for orders and competition among trading market centers. The advocates
claim that optimal competition for orders requires that they all interact in one trading
market. The argument assumes the SEC can establish and keep current an efficient
central market, an unrealistic premise given the inherent problems of government micro
regulation. The so-called tension is a false one: The optimal competition for orders will
come pragmatically through an ever-evolving competition among market centers for
orders. The 94th Congress recognized it and the SEC should be more honest to the vision.
The problems of designing an all-inclusive ITS demonstrate why it would be
better to have competition not only among trading markets for traders but also among
inter-market trading networks for the participation of trading markets. An SEC-mandated
ITS would eliminate two aspects of competition: first, how competitors use any given
inter-market trading system, and second, how competing inter-market trading systems
evolve.
Evidence of the strength of the first form of competition in the market,
competition inside a trading network, is seen in the joint venture between Archipelago
and the Pacific Stock Exchange’s stock trading business.145 The deal gives Archipelago,
an ECN, direct access to the current CQS and ITS as an exchange (ArcaEx)146. ArcaEx
has advertised several exchange innovations. First, members in the current system can
execute in-house all incoming orders as long as they match the best price in the system;
they do not have to route orders to the market that first displayed the best price. But the
Archipelago program promises to automatically route incoming orders to whichever
market has first posted an opposite order at the best price. That is, Archipelago may
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voluntarily offer strict time priority in an effort to woo customers.147 Second,
Archipelago also eliminated the specialist position in favor of competing market makers
on its exchange. And third, traders have more options in how to present their trading
positions in the system:148 reserve orders,149 discretionary orders,150 immediate or cancel
orders,151 now orders,152 and pegged orders153 in addition to the standard limit orders,
stop orders, and market orders. The SEC did not need to “facilitate” or otherwise order
any of the practices or innovations. The NYSE, otherwise a very cautious innovator, has
responded with a new Liquidity Quote of its own.154
Additional evidence of competition inside a trading network is the explosion in
trading centers featuring Nasdaq stock. The NASD System of trade and quotation
reporting has, until now, not contained a trade-through rule and, as is noted in the next
section, Nasdaq stock is now traded on the exchanges, through the Nasdaq Market
Center, formerly known as the SuperMontage System, and on the NASD’s ADF system.
The ADF system is an information processor that is separate from the Nasdaq Market
Center so, although they are both ruled by the NASD, they are in a sense competitors.
As a consequence, there are now three significant trading venues for Nasdaq securities
competing head to head for market share—Nasdaq Market Center, INET, and ArcaEx.155
And, most importantly perhaps, several services access directly the multiple venues for
traders;156 in essence, the ECNs, responding to customer demand, have put in a version of
a trade-through rule on their own,157 all without an SRO or SEC mandate.158
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157
Indeed, some traders fault the Nasdaq Market Center (successor to the SuperMontage) system for not,
on its own, providing a version of a trade-through rule. See Amy Baldwin, “Once-hot Nasdaq Fights to
Reverse Slide,” Chicago Tribune, April 28, 2003, at Bus. Sec., p.6.
158
The proliferation of trading centers in Nasdaq stock has led to an increase in locked and crossed
markets, however. In a locked market the bid and offer quotes are the same; in a crossed market the inside
bid price is greater than the inside sell price. There is some debate over how harmful such situations are
and, if harmful, how to deal with them. E.g., Isabelle Clary, “STA: Ban Fees on Locked Markets,” Sec.
Indus. News, March 31, 2003.
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Evidence of the strength of the second form of competition, competition among
information processors, comes from Internet businesses that interconnect various retail
markets to offer customers the best price alternatives. The travel market, consisting of
airline tickets, hotels, rental cars, and tourist event tickets, is the best example. Anyone
can log on to one of these popular Internet sites and compare prices from a variety of
businesses. The securities trading markets can and will develop competing market
linkage sites that will not only include American markets but also markets abroad
(London, for example) that trade American stocks. Indeed, as noted above, there are
several very creative information processors, such as the Lava Colorbook,159 that
combine the quotes from the various trading markets now. The SEC should not retard the
development of either of these two forms of competition.
Trading markets are no different from any other service markets: the more
competition the better, the less government intervention the better. The majority of the
SEC’s critics who demand a black box or CLOB have it upside down.160 The SEC is too
intrusive already and trying too much now to micro-manage an order routing linkage of
the various trading markets.
I have argued in the previous section that the concept of a centralized order
routing procedure is inconsistent with the intentions of the 94th Congress when it enacted
the 1975 amendments, that is, that the SEC is not authorized by the 1975 amendments to
create a centralized routing procedure. I also believe that the 94th Congress was correct
on its policy preferences. So even if one believes, as the federal courts will undoubtedly
find, that the 1975 amendments do authorize the SEC’s ITS initiatives, I, as a fall back
position, also suggest that the SEC has made a series of policy mistakes and needs to
rethink the conceptual paradigm of its program.

The SEC’s Micro-structuring of Individual Market Center Routing and Execution
Practices: Case Studies of the Regulation of Quote Form and of ECNs
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See supra note 156.
There is a reoccurring proposal to consolidate market trading without the creation of an over-arching
linkage system. Called a “competition for listing” proposal, the advocates would have individual firms
choose, for five-year periods, the exclusive trading markets for their shares. E.g., Laura Nyantung Beny,
U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform
Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 399; Morris Mendelson & Junius W. Peake,
Intermediaries’ or Investors’: Whose Market Is It Anyway?, 19 J. Corp. L. 443 (1994). The proposals
assume, first, that firms would only list in one market (they could choose to list in several), second, that the
intermarket linkage systems would be dismantled, third, that moving from one trading market to another
would be easy (the new delisting rules on the NYSE have not encouraged a move off the market), and,
fourth, that foreign markets would not take up the slack, trading in unlisted shares in American companies.
The first and second problems are interwoven: Intermarket linkages would remain an issue if issuers under
such a system choose to list in more than one market. There may also be some unintended consequences
from such a proposal: Absolute firm control over listing would add another agency problem to the trading
markets that does not now exist; management could abuse the privilege to obtain personal advantage at the
expense of their shareholders (list on a market whose rules prohibit hostile takeovers?). There are other
corporate governance issues as well (Could a firm opt out of making such a choice?).
160
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The SEC is not content to just arbitrate the design of the CTA, CQS and ITS
links. The SEC also writes rules on how market participants must use the links. This
gives the SEC an open license to micro-structure the internal features of the market
centers that are connected by the systems. SEC rules for accessing and using the intermarket links become trading rules for each of the individual trading markets. One of the
true innovators of the ECN, Steve Wunsch, the President of the computerized Arizona
Stock Exchange, defined the issue well in October 29, 1999 letter to the Wall Street
Journal. Wunsch criticized the SEC for “playing God.”
In pursuit of such nebulous concepts as “transparency,” “efficiency” and
“fairness,” the SEC and its academic advisers have relentlessly intervened to
redesign the market structure. But, just as it is difficult to design a better eye or
grain, attempts to turn the stock market into a “level playing field” … have
produced only a slew of unintended consequences…. Why not let the market
structure result from competition rather than mandates from on high? 161
In practice, the SEC reads the 1975 national market system mandate to empower
it to craft a plethora of regulations on the operation of the individual markets. There are
regulations on, among other things, member and subscriber access, price quote and trade
display practices, listing requirements, execution fee schedules, best execution
obligations of brokers, order routing practices, limit order procedures — in short,
regulations on much of the essence of the market structure. It is indeed amazing what
rules the SEC justifies in the name of promoting a national market system. And the
number and scope of the rules continues to grow. Moreover, with the speed of the
changes in the market, the SEC, unless it reverses course, will find itself constantly
tinkering with the rules in a struggle both to keep structure current with technology and to
eliminate what have proven to be past regulatory blunders. The pace of SEC rule making
is at present, not keeping current with market developments.162
Examples of the SEC national market system regulations bleeding into the
regulation of market center internal structures are numerous. A few significant ones are
mentioned below.
Consider first the SEC’s rules on quotation practice. The link between markets
provided by the CQS led the SEC to adopt, in 1978, rule 11Ac1-1 on market makers’
quotation practices. The rule requires market makers’ quotes to be “firm,” to obligate the
quoting market maker (or specialist) to execute a transaction at the quoted price. The rule
also requires all quotes to include a size for which a price is firm.163 The rule sounds
straightforward, but it is not.
Numerous administrative problems have led to repeated amendments to the rule.
The cost burdens of the rule required SEC amendments, for example, that exempted
161

Steven Wunsch, Letter to the Editor, Wall Street Journal, October 29, 1999, at A19.
E.g., Isabelle Clary, “Nasdaq Pushes SEC to Rule on its Status,” Sec. Indus. News, March 17, 2003
(Nasdaq has waited over 20 months on its application to be an exchange).
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This is often the minimum required by each exchange or NASD.
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market makers and exchanges that do less than one percent of the volume in a covered
security, and that protected market makers in periods of usually rapid price
movements.164 There was also a modification for the firm quote obligation when market
makers were executing one order and a second appeared before the market maker had
revised her quote.165 Exceptions for modern innovative securities such as ETFs were
required. More changes were to come.
In September of 1996, the SEC promulgated its so-called Order Handling Rules,
an initiative it often points to with some pride.166 The Order Handling Rules, prompted
by the SEC’s concern over market fragmentation,167 adopted the Display Rule and the
ECN amendment. The Display Rule requires market-makers and specialists to display
customer limit orders and their size when the orders are priced better than the marketmaker’s or specialist’s quote.168 The ECN amendment attempts to eliminate “hidden
markets.” It requires specialists and market-makers who place orders with an ECN at a
price better than her public quotation either (1) make the better price publicly available or
(2) to use an ECN that will publicly disseminate its prices and allow other broker-dealers
access to its system.
In this case, the SEC had it right. The Display Rule has had very positive effects
for the Nasdaq. The Display Rule forced Nasdaq market makers to display customer
limit orders and that, combined with Nasdaq’s new automated trading programs, has
caused a significant increase in customer to customer transactions, transactions without a
dealer as an intermediary.169 This lowers trading costs and makes the market more
attractive to traders. Moreover, the Display Rule put ECNs in direct competition with
traditional Nasdaq market makers in the business of attracting customer limit orders. The
competition among markets drove down market making fees and charges and encouraged
market structure innovations.
The SEC’s regulations on quotation practice also affect the details of the
country’s more innovative automatic execution systems. By way of illustration, consider
the “SOES Bandit” problems of the early ‘90s. The SOES Bandits proved in the early
‘90s that clever traders could beat the SEC’s quote rule.
Nasdaq added a Small Order Execution System in 1985, the SOES.170 The NASD
designed SOES to make it easier for small investors to obtain an automated execution of
their orders. Participation of a market maker in SOES was initially voluntary, but once a
164

See SEC Rule 11c1-1(a)(25), (b)(1) & (b)(3).
SEC Rule 11c1-1( c)(3)(i)B) & (ii)(B).
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The Order Handling Rules provided a short-term shot in the arm to the business of ECNs.
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The SEC expression of this concern is always a signal that order routing requirements are in the offing.
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SEC Rule 11Ac1-4. The Rule applies only to Nasdaq or exchange listed securities. See Order Execution
Obligations, Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-37,619A (Sept. 6, 1996).
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E.g., Gretchen Morgenson, “At Big Board a Disturbing Investigation of a Lesser Sin,” N.Y.Times, April
24, 2003, at C1[dealers only involved in 43% of Nasdaq trades].
170
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exch. Act Re. 34-21,742 (Feb.12, 1985). See also Order
Approving Proposed rule Change to Define Professional Trader for the Purposes of SOES, SEC Exch. Act
Rel. 34-26,361 (Dec. 15, 1988).
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market maker chose to participate in the system, she could not withdraw without the
consent of the NASD. Later SOES became mandatory for NMS stocks, and unexcused
withdrawals now receive a penalty of a twenty-day suspension.171
As a result of the SEC’s firm quote rule and the 1988 rule changes to SOES, a
group of savvy traders took advantage of the system’s automatic execution features to
generate huge trading profits at the expense of the market makers who had trouble
updating their quotes fast enough in a volatile market. There followed a five-year tug of
war between the NASD, attempting to protect its market makers, and the SEC worried
that the NASD’s solutions would stratify the SOES market.172 In the end, the SEC
blocked almost all of the NASD proposed solutions. The NASD now attempts to
discourage SOES bandits through disciplinary actions with some continuing resistance by
the SEC.173 One can take sides in the dispute or just note that the SEC’s quote rule
inevitably caused some unexpected problems for the creation of a workable automated
system.
NASD has since created a SuperSOES (which became the “SuperMontage”
system and now the “Nasdaq Market Center”) and the cascade of SEC rules tweaking and
tinkering with the NASD automated execution system continues unabated.174 This is
discussed further below. A recent quotation, for example, was the NYSE’s demand that
data vendors who want to redisseminate their new Liquidity Quotes not integrate those
quotes with other market center’s quotes.175 The SEC refused the request.176 Also
heavily contested, to the point of litigation, are the SEC rules on removing ECN quotes
from the Nasdaq Market Center system to prevent “locked” or “crossed” markets.177
In any event, rather than letting individual market centers establish their own
quotation procedures, the SEC is now well on its way to the creation and enforcement of
a national rule on quotation practice. The SEC creates the CQS, then a firm quote rule,
then exceptions to the rule and fights the consequences of its rule-making in the trenches
of technical problems with the affected markets. A better practice would be a SEC rule
171

See Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change, SEC Exch. Act Rel. 34-25,791
(June 9, 1988).
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For a history see the Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
Regarding the NASD and the Nasdaq Market, Exch. Act Rel. 34-37,542 (Aug. 8, 1996) at 213-55. The
NASD wanted to ban trades from a “professional trading account” in the SOES system and wanted to give
market-makers a fifteen second grace period between executions. The SEC approved the rules and, stung
by criticism from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reversed itself and repealed
them. In 1994, The SEC approved a one-year pilot program and then refused to renew it in 1995.
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Id.
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Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, “Plan to Upgrade Nasdaq Trading Passes the SEC,” Wall St. J., Jan 11,
2001, At C1.
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See Schroeder, supra note 178.
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Although the SEC seems to have permitted the NYSE to require segmented reported of its Openbook
(limit order) quotes.
177
See Domestic Securities v SEC, 333 F.3d 239 (D.C.Cir. 2003)(contesting “decrementation”). A locked
market occurs when the highest quoted bid price equals the lowest quoted ask price. A crossed market
occurs when the highest bid price is greater than the lowest quoted ask price. Locked or crossed markets
temporarily stall market trading until the market is unlocked or uncrossed.
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that mandates continuous178 trading markets and that provides quotes to all inter-market
systems that will pay for them and that enforces whatever quote practices each market
chooses to develop, implement, and advertise. A market that does not itself offer traders
some sensible version of quotation practice will not last long.
My second example of SEC rules that micro-structure trading markets is the
SEC’s rules for automated order execution services, also known as ECNs (or ATSs).
While the problems with the quote rule are distracting, the SEC’s regulations on ECNs
are serious business. These rules affect the most innovative part of our national securities
markets, the part of our markets that will determine whether the United States maintains
its international pre-eminence in the world’s financial markets. And the SEC has become
very aggressive in regulating ECNs. In new regulations for ECNs, the SEC attempted to
regulate the wind; that is, it took on the task of regulating computerized trading
technology.
As noted above, since 1972, the SEC has thought about some form of centralized
market. While the SEC has been unable to order the use of a preferred centralized
system, it is inching inexorably towards one with a growing package of specialized rules.
It is a bottom-up strategy. A top-down strategy would define and enforce a detailed best
execution obligation for market participants; but such an obligation is too hard to define
with the concreteness necessary for a day-to-day direction of trading practices.179 A
bottom-up strategy, accumulating rules in specific situations, is more politically feasible.
The SEC’s bottom-up strategy, if that’s what it is, seems to have two parts. First,
the SEC mandates order routing links through the ITS for listed securities and through the
Nasdaq National Market Execution System System (or ADF) for NMS securities.
Second, the SEC imposes individual obligations on market participants to direct their
orders through these systems pursuant to a growing body of operating rules. While the
first step was discussed above (Regulation NMS is the SEC’s boldest step in this strategy
and takes the agency very close to its goal, a centralized national trading market system),
the second step means that the SEC must take increasing control over the details of the
operating systems of the ITS participants or National Center.
Prior to proposing Regulation NMS in 2004, the SEC had considered seriously
rules on internalization,180 payment for order flow,181 order exposure,182 and trade-
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A pure non-continuous, periodic auction market ought not have to provide open quotes; its does not
have any.
179
A broker-dealer that receives a customer order has a duty of best execution under the common law of
agency and, if the doctrine is still viable, the “shingle theory.” A broker-dealer hangs out its shingle when
it offers to deal with customers. See Charles Huges & Co. v SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943). See
generally Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1271 (1995). The duty
cannot be confined to obtaining the best price, it also includes other aspects of order handling, such as
speed and certainty of execution. See Disclosure of Order Routing and Execution Practices, Exch. Act Rel.
34-43,084 (July 28,2000) at 5-9.
180
The practice of a broker-dealer routing orders to its own market-making desk or to an affiliate for
execution.
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through.183 It had adopted none of the proposals and settled for a more traditional SEC
approach to confounding regulatory problems, a new detailed public disclosure rule. In
November of 2000, the SEC adopted a Disclosure Release that requires market makers
and broker-dealers to make extensive public disclosures regarding order routing and
execution practices.184
Rule 11Ac1-5 requires “market centers” to make specified information available
to the public on a monthly basis in electronic form and Rule 11Ac1-6 requires brokerdealers to disseminate quarterly reports on their routing practices. Rule 11Ac1-6 also
requires, among other things, broker-dealers to reveal material aspects of their
relationship to market centers, including arrangements of payment for order flow or other
profit sharing arrangements. The SEC hopes the disclosure will discipline market makers
with publicity, provide a vehicle for enforcement actions against misbehaving market
makers,185 and encourage traders to select market makers with preferred execution
practices.186
But the Disclosure Release has been a temporary (although welcome) respite.
The SEC has also been piecing together a quilt of very specific order execution practices
in selected contexts. The SEC’s biggest recent leap in regulating execution practices has
been in the regulation of ECNs. In the past decade, entrepreneurs with expertise in
telecommunications and computers have developed a variety of alternative securities
trading systems that have the potential for becoming substitutes for traditional securities
exchanges. These computerized trading systems now handle over 50% of the orders in
securities listed on the Nasdaq and almost seven percent of the orders in all exchangelisted securities.187
The ECN sector has evolved rapidly over the few years in which it has been
robust. There were over a dozen ECNs operating in the late ‘90s and there are only six
ECNs left today. The year 2002 was marked by heavy consolidation. Of the six ECNs
left only three have substantial volume. One of the three ECNs, Archipelago, has joined
with the Pacific Stock Exchange to become ArcaEx. The other two ECNs, both divisions
of Instinet, operate as quasi-exchanges. Instinet itself, is the only major participant on the
181

The practice of market-makers providing compensation to broker-dealers that route the order for
execution. Payments for order flow may take many forms other than cash. A market-maker may, for
example, offer clearing services to the directing broker-dealer.
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An order exposure rule would require a broker-dealer, before executing an order as a principle, to
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A trade-through rule would require broker-dealers executing customer orders to route the order to the
market center that is providing the best price. At present in the ITS system, a market maker has the option
of meeting another market’s best price rather than routing an order to that market.
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Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, Exch. Act Rel. 34-43,590 (Nov. 17,2000).
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A market maker who is misbehaving is also likely to lie on the disclosures and a suit based on lying is
easier to bring and prove.
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The new filings have been a valuable source of information that otherwise might not be public. Rule
11A(c )1-5 filings of the NYSE, for example, an exchange that is historically very parsimonious with its
internal operating data, has opened a few eyes.
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SEC Release No. 34-50700: Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation Nov. 18, 2004.
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NASD alternative display facility (ADF) and its division, INET, is the only big player left
on the National Stock Exchange (formerly the Cincinnati Stock Exchange). Nasdaq
achieved ECN status by merging with BRUT. As a result of proposed Regulation NMS
more consolidations no doubt lay ahead188 this is exacerbated by the fact that several of
the major players are reporting operating losses.189
The SEC struggled in the late ‘90s with the problem of how to regulate the new,
emerging ECNs. Traditional market centers, asking the SEC to stifle these dangerous
new competitors, complained about market fragmentation and an unequal regulatory
playing field. The ECNs just asked the SEC to be left alone; they knew they could
compete successfully with traditional market makers. The only rule holding ECNs up
was the ITS trade through rule on exchange listed securities.
The first big SEC action affecting ECNs was not directly aimed at them, the
Order Handling Rules of 1996.190 The Rules were aimed at traditional market makers
and their refusal to publicly quote limit orders that bettered their displayed quotes.
Forcing OTC market makers to display their BBO limit orders created a temporary boon
to ECNs that were used by market makers to post alternative quotes. Four ECNs
registered with the NASD immediately after the release.
The SEC’s major directive aimed directly at ECNs came a few years later. After
releasing three major series of proposed rules, each over one hundred text pages, the SEC
settled on rules that became effective on April 21, 1999.191 In essence, the SEC gives an
ECN two options. First, an ECN can choose to register as national securities exchange
and meet the very expensive licensing requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Act.192 Or, second, an ECN can choose to register as a “broker/dealer” and comply with
188

There are repeated rumors of merger talks between NASD’s Nasdaq Market Center (successor to the
SuperMontage) System and Archipelago. E.g., “Nasdaq Sets Sight on Acquisitions,” Fin. Times Info.
Global News Wire, March 11, 2003.
These rumors ended with Nasdaq’s acquisition of the BRUT ECN. INET, the largest and most
powerful of the remaining independent ECNs, is likely to file for SRO status, or merge with one of the
other regional exchanges. See Schmerken, supra note 146.
189
In the last quarter of 2002, Instinet reported an operating loss of $10 million. In 2002, Instinet posted a
net loss of $735 million, which included at one-time charge of $102 million for the purchase of Island. See
Isabelle Clary, “Reuters Mulling Instinet’s Future,” Sec. Indus. News, Feb. 17, 2003.
Reuters continues to mull over the possibility of selling the Instinet Group, and the combination
ENC/broker dealer remains available for the right buyer. Anderson, Owner of Big Stock Trading System is
Said to be for Sale, New York Times, November 18, 2004, Section C2.
AMEX which had a net loss of $14.3 million from 2001 to 2003 has been spun-off by NASD to its
members as of January 2005. Jed Horowitz, NASD Completes its Sale of Amex to Member Group, New
York Times, January 4, 2005, Section C3.
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Securities and Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-37619A (Sept. 6, 1996), 61 Fed. Reg. 48290 (Sept 12, 1996)
191
Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 43-40760 (December 8, 1998).
192
Consider the operations of a basic ECN. The owner of a large capacity computer writes software to
match buyers and sellers, software that the owner believes will appeal to a large number of traders.
Traders, both buyers and sellers, subscribe, pay a fee, log on, and place bid and ask orders. The computer
matches the trades that it can in a pre-established format. The traders are then notified of the matches.
Unmatched traders are either cancelled after a set period of time or forwarded to other markets. The
software programs can and, without SEC involvement, would differ from one another in many respects: the
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the special licensing requirements of a new Regulation ATS.193 Both options come with
substantial costs.
Under Regulation ATS, an ECN can participate in the ITS through the
NASD/CAES outdated routing platform or through a regional exchange, in both cases
paying a competitor access fees. An ECN trading in Nasdaq stock can post on the NASD
System as a market maker or list on the new NASD Alternative Display Facility (ADF),
paying substantial NASD fees in both cases. All but one of the existing ECNs, ArcaEx,
has opted for Regulation ATS status rather than register as a securities exchange.194 The
ECNs complain that the NASD access fees add substantial costs to their operations and
that the NASD equipment is “old and clunky.”195 As a consequence, one ECN has

type of trader that the program allows to log on; the types of display of the size, price and participant
identity for any pending orders; the types of access non-subscribers have to price quotes; the publication of
the size, price and identity of participants in any successfully matched trade; and the mechanics of the
matching process.
There are many variations of matching processes that might be used to attract traders. A software
program could run a call auction at set times (the Arizona Stock Exchange), a continuous matching system
with first-in-time priority (INET), or a crossing system that matches unpriced orders at a single price
established in another market (Posit), for example. One of the more innovative systems that began with
much fanfare and failed was the OptiMark system that allows traders to post orders for different amounts of
securities at different prices.
If an ECN chooses to register as an exchange, it must develop a self-regulatory organization side
to its business, an SRO. Consider what this entails. The SRO must include an internal compliance system
for its owners and subscribers. The compliance system must include a “fair procedure” for any disciplinary
actions. The SRO would also have to develop a package of rules designed, among other things, to prevent
Fraudulent and manipulative practices, to allocate fees for access to the ECN, and to regulate trading by
owners and employees.
But why should the SEC require the owner of such a system to form an SRO? There is no
traditional exchange membership to discipline. The ECN sells its services to subscribers and should be
allowed to terminate subscribers at will or under other conditions set forth in the subscriber contracts.
There are far fewer insiders to monitor. An ECN replaces floor brokers and specialists by a machine and
technicians. There are minimal listing requirements for the stock traded. The drastic reduction in
manpower at the point of trade in an ECN suggests that there need only be laws that require an ECN to
operate free from Fraud and to record an audit trade for trades (to detect insider trading and the like). Such
a law might require that any ECN be honestly advertised to subscribers and deliver on its promises. There
is no longer a need for complex monitoring and compliance systems on each trading system. If each ECN
creates an SRO there will be, at minimum, excessive duplication among the various regulatory bodies of
each ECN and an unnecessary cost burden on each ECN that must be passed on to subscribers in the form
of higher fees.
193
If an ECN chooses that alternative, it will fall under the jurisdiction of the NASD’s huge SRO, the
NASDR, that covers all brokers/dealers in the securities industry. If an ECN attempts to avoid the burdens
of creating and maintaining an SRO by not registering as an exchange, then it must register as a
broker/dealer and be subject to the SRO subsidiary of NASD, the NASDR. Yet NASD ran two competing
markets, the Nasdaq and the AMEX until January 2005, when the AMEX was spun-off to NASD members.
See Horowitz, supra note 189. To eliminate potential conflicts of interest, the NASD took pains to separate
the operation of its trading markets from the operation of its disciplinary arm through a holding company
structure. Yet the parent corporation is still run by securities professionals who may have interests in one
or more of the trading markets. (The logic of the separation of the divisions is obvious and ought to mature
into a total separation of the two functions. NASD ought not run the NASDR.)
194
INET continues to consider the possibility. See Schmerken, supra note 146.
195
E.g., Robert Sales, The Big Picture—ECN Evolution, Wall Street & Technology, Feb. 1, 2003 at D6.
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jumped to the ADF and another posts on a regional exchange. ECNs also attack the ADF
system as using “obscure technology.”196
Despite regulatory burdens, ECNs continue to take Nasdaq market share in
trading volume. NASD first sought regulatory relief, complaining to the SEC of
“regulatory arbitrage” and seeks to have a uniform set of rules across the various markets
trading Nasdaq listed securities.197 When the SEC balked, NASD fought back by
spending $100 million to develop the SuperMontage System (predecessor to the Nasdaq
National Market Execution System) that is its own version of an ECN. In the original
NASD proposal, however, the new system subordinated executions of large classes of
ECN trades.198 The NASD proposal discriminated against trades submitted to the new
system by ECNs that did not accept automatic order executions. The SEC, barraged by
angry ECN complaints, responded with a proposal that discriminated against only those
ECNs that charged access fees.199 A donnybrook ensued with ECNs negotiating for eight
amendments to the SuperMontage proposal before the SEC adopted the new system. The
amendment proposals continue post-adoption.200 As negotiated, the SuperMontage was
not the threat to the large ECNs that people thought it would be; it has hurt the smaller
ECNs, however.201
The final SuperMontage system emerged with a complex labyrinth of trading
choices. It was a Solomonic compromise of the highest order. “Directed” orders, orders
sent to specific market centers, have to be oversized to limit dual liability problems.
Parties sending “undirected” orders have four choices: (1) the usual order algorithm of
the system; (2) the order exposed, successively, with time priority to defined market
tiers;202 (3) the order exposed, successively, with size priority to defined market tiers;
and (4) a reduced priority for ECNs charging separate access fees unless the ECN’s quote
net of fees is still the best price.
There is much potential mischief in the SEC’s role of monitoring ECNs. The
SEC cannot resist the temptation to tinker with the operating characteristics of ECNs —
196

See Domestic Securities, note 10 supra, at 249.
See Clary, infra note 201.
198
See generally Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Exch. Act Rel. 34-42,166 (Nov. 22, 1999); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 43863 (January
19, 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 8020 (January 26, 2001).
199
For a history see Borrelli , supra note 6, at 869- 878.
200
The most recent is Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of
Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. Clarifying the Operation of the Daily Opening Process in Nasdaq's Nasdaq Market Center (successor
to the SuperMontage) System, SEC Rel. No. 34-47735, April 24, 2003. Another important request is SelfRegulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Regarding Fees for the
Reporting of Nasdaq Market Center (successor to the SuperMontage) Transactions through the Automated
Confirmation Transaction Service ("ACT"), SEC Exch. Act Rel. No.34-47621, April 2, 2003[Nasdaq is
asking to lower access fees for reporting internalized orders to compete with lower fees charged, among
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all in the name of consumer welfare, of course. For example, in a classic misstep, the
SEC required all ECNs registered under Regulation ATS to publicly display the full size
of its best buy and sell orders if the ECN volume in a security is five percent or more of
the security’s average daily volume.203 Thus if an ECN grows significantly, processing a
higher volume of orders, it may have to alter its operating system to allow for such
display. Moreover, a five percent volume limits an ECN to using a “reserve system”
method of hiding full order size if a trader wants to retain the ability to post single large
orders in a way that does not immediately come to the attention of other dealers. The
SEC has also required Regulation ATS ECNs to afford non-subscribers execution access
to ECN quotes for “fair fees” again at a five percent threshold.204 But an ECN’s control
over its subscriber base is a crucial aspect of its overall business strategy.
The SEC, in settling the dispute between NASD and the ECNs, found itself in the
too comfortable position of arbitrating a dispute between competitors that, in essence,
micro-structured the new computerized trading markets. These tortured, nuanced
negotiations over the routing practices of the SuperMontage System were just the
beginning of a larger negotiation. Just as the basic procedure of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, narrowly applied to control bribery abroad, produced the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that broadly applied the same procedure to all internal
accounting and disclosure procedures, the SuperMontage rule making presaged a much
larger negotiation over computerized order routing and execution market wide that
manifest in Regulation NMS. The new Regulation may give the SEC the breakthrough
precedent it has sought for so long—the opportunity to fashion the creation and operation
of an over-arching national computerized market system.
So where are we? The existing structure of the securities markets in the United
States is excessively complex and it has been created primarily by, or with the approval
of, the SEC. Years of particularized rule making have accumulated to encrust our
securities markets. Traders and trading centers now engage in regulatory arbitrage,
seeking loopholes in the regulatory system,205 for short-term advantages and the SEC
struggles with the cries of injured participants. And yet with each new initiative, the SEC
claims it has acted with self-restraint, modestly, only at the margins, and in cooperation
with market participants.206 So the SEC can claim, after having overseen the creation of
a cumbersome, overly-regulated system, with multiple tiers and sub-tiers, that with each
new rule it will “let the markets work” and act “incrementally.”207
An Alternative SEC History
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One of my favorite books on the Civil War speculates on the outcome of the
Battle of Gettysburg and the War itself given different decisions by Confederate Generals
of each major day of the battle.208 It is a great read, provocative, and, in a way, pointless.
In the same vein, one can ask where would we be had there been an alternate SEC after
1975 -- a SEC that followed a less ambitious path on the creation of a national market
system, a SEC that in my view stayed within the outlines of Congress’s purpose and
intent behind the 1975 Amendments.
Consistent with the analysis above, there would be competing cross-market
information processors collecting last sale and other transaction data and collecting
quotations from independent trading market centers. The market centers themselves
would not have any ownership or management positions in the processors. Individual
processors could ask for, process, and package the information from trading centers as
they saw fit and negotiate on fees. The SEC would monitor the accuracy of the processors
and watch for anti-competitive fee arrangements. The market centers could publish
initially their transaction and quotation data themselves or provide it to the processors for
initial publication. There would no be discrimination in fees charged any processors by
any of the market centers unless based on objective, neutral business related criteria. If
centers do choose to self-publish the data, the SEC would ensure that processors could
republish the information.209
Order execution systems would depend entirely on market center designed
processes, accurately communicated to traders. The SEC would monitor the accuracy of
the disclosures and enforce rules against misleading practices or conduct.
Order execution systems that were the most efficient would attract the most traders. Each
center would be responsible for creating, on its own or with others, an audit trail for
surveillance purposes.
All market center rules and practices designed to restrain members, market
makers, broker-dealers, traders, securities, or firms from acting in several markets or
from routing trades easily from one market to another or among markets would have been
eliminated. Refusals to deal and cartels would be disfavored and subject to traditional
antitrust analysis and scrutiny. There could, for example, be no execution discrimination
in one market of trades originating in another or of trades originating with non-members
if not based on some neutral criteria such as price or time priority. Any market center
could list and trade any security and could choose to qualify or otherwise classify listed
securities under neutral, objective criteria. Mergers among market centers would be
subject to a monopolization (Clayton Act) test.
Any order routing procedures between market centers would occur naturally, as
market center affiliates could choose to be members of each other, or be negotiated at the
market level, the subject of joint venture agreements, both with minimal SEC direction
and involvement. Only if a joint venture raises anti-competitive concerns under a
208
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At no charge? This would encourage the centers to negotiate with processors for fees for the data.
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traditional anti-trust merger analysis should the SEC intervene.210 Otherwise traders are
free to route orders to the market of their choice using their own market comparison
systems and their own routing procedures. Market makers and other broker-dealer
intermediaries would have to accurately describe to customers and traders their routing
practices and preferences.211 The SEC’s primary role would enforce the quality and
truthfulness of the disclosures.
I suspect that under such a system, several, privately-owned212 computerized
execution systems would dominate the trading market and that they would come and go
as technology improves and as traders’ preferences change. Customers with
sophistication could choose to use a preferred system without resort to financial
intermediaries. We would not have open outcry pits or auction floors, nor would be have
a geographical convergence in New York or Chicago.
But, as noted above, this speculation is, in a sense, pointless. We are well down
another path, one to a quasi-centralized trading market, with very powerful interest
groups holding a stake in existing and evolving structures. The SEC having chosen and
groomed this path is now committed, ironically, to acting “incrementally.” To this author
it appears that the SEC is unlikely to retrace its steps.
Conclusion
The SEC has currently in its hands and extraordinary array of rule requests and
initiatives on essential elements of the United States securities market structure.213
Market participants wait while the SEC ponders.214 With each new SEC pronouncement,
the market participants will adapt; some will get or maintain a step and some will lose a
step in the competition. And there will be a new round of rule requests with affected
parties seeking modifications and exemptions, whatever the SEC decision.
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The stranglehold of an ITS on trading listed stock would not happen, as markets in which market makers
could route orders to markets offering better prices would occur naturally. Moreover, order routing could
occur either through an ITS like system or through a system of diffuse, privately developed communication
channels or both.
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Pressure from customers would cause intermediaries to establish and advertise their own form of best
execution practices.
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They could be privately-held, publicly-traded or not-for-profit trade associations, as the NYSE is now. I
suspect that the publicly-traded companies would have a competitive advantage over the other two forms
and that the publicly-traded form will dominate.
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To list some of them: The Nasdaq wants exchange status and has also petitioned for “uniform rules” for
all markets trading Nasdaq listed shares; ECNs want rules rewritten to enable them to trade listed shares;
market centers want a new division of data revenue fees and market participants want lower market access
fees; ECNs are contesting each other’s access fees; Nasdaq is becoming an ECN and competing with
other ECNs over which its parent NASD regulates and provides reporting services; Nasdaq’s declining
market share in its listed stock; mergers among the few remaining ECNs; the NYSE seems to want to
eliminate the intermarket links, the CTA, CQS, and ITS; problems with locked and crossed markets in
Nasdaq stock; problems with specialists behavior on the NYSE; questions about the governance
procedures of the NYSE and other exchanges; requests to modify the trade-through rule on the ITS; and
the never receding recommendations of academics for one centralized, automated trading market.
214
Proposed Regulation NMS attempts to answer several of the questions. If the Regulation is
implemented, however, there will be more.
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The SEC would be well advised to consider the current predicament of the
Federal Communications Commission, a federal agency that has made a hash out of
regulating the exploding technology in the telecommunications business.215 Clever
regulatory ideas for telecommunications have turned into business straightjackets.216
Business niches now flourish or dry up with each regulatory pronouncement.217 No one
in the industry is happy and yet proposals for sensible regulatory changes create nothing
but logjams as offsetting powerful, vested interests square off in the political arena.218
At issue is whether the SEC will stumble into a similar thicket.
Professor Walter Werner wrote in exasperation on the debate over the 1975
amendments that “[t]he best thing that can be said about government’s past regulation of
market structure is that the market survived it…. But the markets may not continue to be
so durable.”219 His words ring true today.
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